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"NICE WORK IF YOU CAN GET IT":'
"ETHICAL" JURY SELECTION IN
CRIMINAL DEFENSE
Abbe Snitz**
[H]ow necessary it is that a prisoner... should have a good opinion
of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him .... [TIhe
law wills not that [a litigant] should be tried by any one man against
whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to as-
sign a reason for such his dislike.
-William Blackstone t
Every knowing lawyer seeks for a jury of the same sort of men as
his client; men who will be able to imagine themselves in the same
situation and realize what verdict the client wants.
... In this undertaking, everything pertaining to the prospective
juror needs to be questioned and weighed: his nationality, his busi-
ness, religion, politics, social standing, family ties, friends, habits of
life and thought; the books and newspapers he likes and reads, and
many more matters that combine to make a man ....
-Clarence Darrow"
I. Two STORIES ABOUT PICKING A JURY IN THE 1990s
A Black Man Faces a White Jury PanelC HARLES Reed3 had the talent and good fortune to attend the
United States Military Academy at West Point, where he did well,
and went on to Harvard Medical School. He was every mother's
dream: clean-cut, soft-spoken, and devoted to his family and church,
the young African American medical student was liked and admired
by all who encountered him.
No one had a bad thing to say about Reed-except the tvo white
officers from the Cambridge Police Department who pulled him over
* George Gershwin & Ira Gershwin, Nice Work if You Can Get It, on Damsel in
Distress (Warner Records 1937).
** Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
B.A. Yale University, 1978; J.D. New York University School of Law, 1982. Thanks
to Tanya Pilipshen and Jill Sheldon for helpful research assistance. Thanks also to
Jeffrey Abramson, John Copacino, Jennifer DiToro, Paul Holland, Eva Nilsen,
Cookie Ridolfi, Ilene Seidman, Heathcoate Wales, Diane Wiley, and Ellen
Yaroshefsky.
1. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *1024.
2. Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, Esquire, May 1936, at 36, 36.
3. This story and the one that follows come from real cases in which I was coun-
sel. The names in this story and the one that follows have been changed out of re-
spect for my clients' privacy. Both clients gave me permission to write about their
cases.
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one morning as he was driving in his late model, shiny black Acura
Integra to the lab where he worked. They claimed he had run a stop
sign. He protested that he had not. They told him to stay in his car
and produce his license and registration. He wanted to get out to
show the officers his West Point decal on the back of his car to let
them know he posed no danger. As a young black man who had been
stopped by the police before,4 Reed found that officers were less hos-
tile when they learned that he was a military man-an officer like
them.
From there, the accounts diverge. The two officers claimed that in a
fit of temper, Reed emerged from his car and assaulted both of them
and needed to be forcibly taken down to the ground in order to sub-
due and handcuff him. Reed asserted that in response to what they
considered his "uppity"5 behavior, the police grabbed him, pinned
him against his car, threw him down to the street, shoved his face in
the asphalt, handcuffed him from behind, and held him there, one of-
ficer on top of Reed, his knee digging painfully into Reed's back.
Reed was arrested and charged with two counts of assault and bat-
tery of a police officer.6 He asked me to be his lawyer and I agreed.
Maintaining his innocence, he rejected a lenient plea offer and re-
quested a jury trial.
Some months later, when the nearly all-white venire entered the
room for jury selection, I was not surprised. I had been practicing in
both Boston and Cambridge for several years and was familiar with
the demographics. Although we had talked about the likely jury pool,
my client was stunned to actually see it. "You're kidding," he said.
"These are the people who are going to choose between two white
cops and me?"
4. The phenomenon of young black males being pulled over by police officers for
driving late model cars-or any motor vehicle-has come to be known as "DWB"
(Driving While Black). See Warren Brown, Seat Belt Push Raises Race Issue: Blacks
Weigh Tolls of Safety vs. Bias, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1998, at Al ("There are virtually no
African American males-including congressmen, actors, athletes and office work-
ers-who have not been stopped at one time or another for an alleged traffic viola-
tion, namely driving while black .... ." (quoting Michigan Congressman John Conyers,
Jr.)); Editorial, Color-Coded Expectations, Boston Globe, Feb. 20, 1998, at A18 (not-
ing that innocent behavior, like a black person simply "getting in [a] car" gives rise to
the "common, unofficial vehicular offense dubbed DWB-driving while black").
Once African American drivers are stopped, they are subjected to greater police in-
trusion than white drivers. See Traffic Stop Bias Reported, Wash. Post, June 9, 1997, at
A4 (reporting that black drivers stopped on the Florida Turnpike by law enforcement
are 6.5 times more likely to be searched than white motorists).
5. See, e.g., Cheryl Lavin, The Prime Time of Bryant Gumbel, Chi. Trib., Sept. 28,
1997, Magazine, at 12 (referring to Bryant Gumbel, the former anchor of the "Today"
show: "If you like [him], he's confident; if you don't, he's arrogant. Arrogant, [Gum-
bel] says, is just another word for uppity.").
6. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 265, § 13D (Law. Co-op. 1992). In Massachusetts,
two counts of assault and battery of a police officer carry a maximum sentence of five
years. See id.
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Jury selection was over in no time, despite our efforts to render it a
lengthier, more meaningful process.7 The judge was from the Any-
Twelve-in-the-Box-Wfll-Do school of jury selection.8 He did not be-
lieve in questioning jurors individually,9 allowing attorneys to conduct
voir dire, 1° or asking would-be jurors open-ended or probing ques-
tions." He had little patience with the questions we drafted for the
7. See generally Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury 150-51 (1994) (describing an ap-
proach to jury selection built on individualized and open-ended questioning and es-
tablishing a relationship with prospective jurors: "The key was to stimulate
prospective jurors to give lengthy responses-something not easy to accomplish given
most people's fear of public speaking"); Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preser'-
ing "Its Wonderful Power," 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545 (1975) [hereinafter Babcock, Voir
Dire] (espousing the importance of a searching voir dire in obtaining an impartial jury
and arguing against devices that limit voir dire).
8. For some scholars, seating the first twelve jurors "out of the box" is consistent
with democratic theory. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Sug-
gested Reforms, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1169, 1182 (1995) ("By and large, the first
twelve persons picked by lottery should form the jury.... Juries should represent the
people, not the parties."). For judges, seating the first twelve potential jurors out of
the box may be more about pragmatism than political philosophy. See, e.g., Raymond
Brown, Peremptory Challenges as a Shield for the Pariah, 31 Am. Crim. L Rev. 1203,
1210 (1994) [hereinafter Brown, Shield for the Pariah] ("In most of the vicinages in
America, judges are evaluated not on the Solomonic content of their opinions, but on
how many cases they move. [Lawyers are not allowed to] take too much time, espe-
cially in jury selection-'Because you know counsel, I could take the first twelve peo-
ple and try this case'....").
9. See 1 National Jury Project, Inc., Jurywork: Systematic Techniques § 2.11[1],
at 2-72.30 (Elissa Kraus & Beth Bonora eds., 2d ed. 1997) ("[T]he group voir dire
setting can impede honest statements of opinion or bias."). Robert B. Hirschhorn, a
jury consultant, provides a dramatic example of individualized questioning. In a case
in which a defendant was accused of stabbing a sixteen-year-old girl, each prospective
juror was asked, "Can you look Kevin in the eyes and say, 'Kevin, I can give you a fair
trial?"' Philipp M. Gollner, Consulting by Peering into Minds of Jurors, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 7, 1994, at A23. Prospective jurors were excused or not depending on their re-
sponse to the question and the manner in which they responded. See id.
10. See 1 National Jury Project, Inc., supra note 9, § 2.11313], at 2-73 ("In every
jurisdiction where judge-conducted voir dire is the usual practice, attorneys should try
to convince the judge that voir dire conducted by attorneys is a better tool for uncov-
ering bias." (footnote omitted)). For discussions of the efficacy of attorney-conducted
voir dire over judge-conducted voir dire for uncovering bias, see Reid Hastie, Is At-
torney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of Impartial Ju-
ries?, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 703, 724 (1991) (noting that attorney-conducted voir dire
tends to improve the likelihood of uncovering bias in prospective jurors, because of
closer scrutiny of answers by lawyers and because lawyers are not regarded by jurors
as having the same degree of authority as judges); Stephanie Nickerson et al., Racism
in the Courtroom, in Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism 255,265 (John F. Dovidio
& Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (noting that when judges conduct voir dire, pro-
spective jurors tend to give socially acceptable answers in order to please an authority
figure).
11. See 1 National Jury Project, Inc., supra note 9, § 2.11[2], at 2-72.32 ("Open-
ended, non-leading questions encourage respondents to explain their opinions and
attitudes in their own words, thus penetrating stereotyped and socially desirable re-
sponses."); see also 2 id § 17.03[4], at 17-52 to -55 (indicating that only when attorneys
are permitted to conduct extensive voir dire into the question of racial prejudice, in-
cluding asking many sensitive and specific questions, do prospective jurors ever reveal
such prejudice); cf Ann Fagan Ginger, What Can Be Done to Minimize Racism in
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court to pose to prospective jurors12 and generally seemed to consider
voir dire a waste of time. He disparaged our assertion that race was at
issue in the case, 3 and rejected our request to question prospective
jurors about their feelings regarding the interracial nature of the crime
or their attitudes about young African American men, violence, and
crime. 4 He agreed instead to ask a watered-down question that was a
composite of several proposed questions and included a reference to
race.15
After this abbreviated voir dire, during which those panel members
who could not be fair and impartial were excused for cause and we
learned next to nothing about the others, we turned to what we did
know in order to exercise our peremptory challenges. From the com-
puter print-outs we were provided, we knew the prospective jurors'
names, ages, where they lived, what they did for a living, and what
their spouses did. From our own observations, we knew something
about their race, gender, and ethnicity.
For better or worse, and with no hesitation, my co-counsel and I
relied on these factors in selecting a jury. We wanted as many black
or Hispanic jurors as we could get. We exercised all of our peremp-
tory challenges to excuse whites.
A White Man Faces a Black Jury Panel
Like Charles Reed, Don Nealy was an aspiring doctor who had
worked hard to get where he was. Born into a large Irish-Catholic
family, he understood at a young age that college and graduate school
were luxuries his parents could not afford. Nealy worked his way
Jury Trials?, 20 J. Pub. L. 427, 434-41 (1971) (describing the "probing of jurors for
hidden prejudice[s]" during voir dire); Mark Soler, "A Woman's Place... ". Combat-
ing Sex-Based Prejudices in Jury Trials Through Voir Dire, 15 Santa Clara L. Rev. 535,
539 (1975) (discussing "the use of voir dire in isolating, confronting, and 'minimizing'
sex-based discrimination in jury trials").
12. See 1 National Jury Project, Inc., supra note 9, § 2.12[1], at 2-82 ("With a
judge-conducted voir dire it is best to submit no more than twenty or thirty proposed
questions which are clearly relevant to the issues in the case, in addition to demo-
graphic questions.... The questions submitted to the judge should include some that
are open-ended and at least a few that require follow-up.").
13. See 2 id. § 17.03[4], at 17-52 ("Jurors' judgments are influenced by the race of
the participants in a trial .... Whenever criminal defendants ... are minority group
members, attention must be directed to exploring white prospective jurors' racial be-
liefs and attitudes.").
14. See id. § 3.08[101[d]; 2 id. §§ 17.03[4]-[5], 21.03[3][a]-[b], 21.05[31[b] (providing
sample questions for prospective jurors about their racial attitudes).
15. The judge allowed this question: "The defendant is an African American
medical student. The complainants are white police officers. Is there anything about
these facts that would interfere with your ability to be a fair and impartial juror in this
case?" Among the jurors who raised their hands in response to this question, only
one indicated that the race of the parties would affect her ability to be fair. This
prospective juror, one of the few African Americans in the venire, stated that she was
active in community efforts relating to police harassment of young African American
males. She was excused for cause.
[Vol. 67
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through high school and college and joined the Army in order to pay
for medical school at the University of Maryland. In addition to his
medical studies, Nealy worked part-time as a surgical technician.
Married and the father of a young child, Nealy needed the extra
money.
Between the demands of medical school, work, and family, Nealy
had little spare time. His one indulgence was fishing, a favorite child-
hood pastime he had managed to maintain. He subscribed to fishing
magazines, kept up with the latest fishing equipment, researched local
ponds and rivers, and headed out to catch a few fish on a rare week-
end morning when he was not needed elsewhere.
One such summer morning, just past dawn, he drove to the Tidal
Basin in Washington, D.C. He had fished there the week before with
success. He parked his car and carried his gear down to a secluded
area under an overpass. As he was making his way there, he
remembered a lure he had lost the previous week. He was looking for
it when he came upon a homeless man who was living across from
where Nealy was about to fish. He asked the man about the lost
lure-more aggressively than he had intended-and an argument
broke out. The homeless man took offense at Nealy's question; he
thought Nealy was accusing him of taking the lure. Nealy took of-
fense at the other man's aggressive outburst; suddenly, and for no real
reason, the homeless man was spewing foul language, insults, and
threats.
After some back-and-forth, Nealy began to feel that the whole thing
was getting blown out of proportion. He looked around for some
park police to defuse the situation. Finding none, Nealy told the
homeless man he was finished arguing and just wanted to fish. But
the other man was not finished. When Nealy began to fish on the
other side of the stream a few feet from the steps leading down from
the overpass, the other man was summoning another homeless man
who was living in the area. The two men climbed up on the overpass
and came after Nealy, hurling a bottle at him from above and threat-
ening to kill him. Nealy was cornered. The only way out was up the
steps to where his assailants were perched.
Outnumbered and fearing the worst, Nealy grabbed his fishing
knife and ran up the stairs, yelling at the men: "Get the hell away
from here. Leave me alone." This conduct enraged the second home-
less man, who drew his own knife and responded to Nealy's arrival on
the overpass by charging at him and stabbing him in the face. Nealy
grabbed the man's arm to prevent him from stabbing Nealy again, and
struck back. Adrenaline pumping, he plunged his fishing knife into
the other man's body. When the man collapsed, Nealy knew he had
caused serious damage. When park rangers and police officers finally
arrived at the scene, Nealy urged them to get an ambulance immedi-
ately; the man had been eviscerated.
1998]
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The man was pronounced dead at the hospital, and Nealy was
charged with his murder. Initially represented by other counsel, when
Nealy arrived at my office he had been indicted for manslaughter.' 6
Maintaining innocence, Nealy said that he had acted in self-defense
and did not mean to kill. He requested a jury trial.
Some months later, when the nearly all-black venire entered the
room for jury selection, I was not surprised. Although I was new to
the D.C. area, I was familiar with the demographics. Although we
had talked about the likely jury pool, my client was stunned to actu-
ally see it. "You're kidding," he said. "These are the people who are
going to choose between two African American guys and me?"
As in the Reed case, jury selection was swift. The presiding judge
came from the same school of jury selection as the judge in the Reed
case. He denied our motion for attorney-conducted, individual, se-
questered voir dire, and rejected almost all of the questions we pro-
posed. Although he agreed that race might be an issue in the case, he
was not convinced it was the overriding issue and was willing to ask
only one watered-down question that was a composite of a number of
requested questions and included a reference to race. 17
After this abbreviated voir dire, during which the disinclined and
disenchanted were excused for cause, and we learned little about the
others, we turned to what we did know in order to exercise our per-
emptory challenges. From the computer print-outs we were provided,
we knew the prospective jurors' names, ages, where they lived, and
what they did for a living. From our own observations, we knew
something about their race, gender, and ethnicity.
For better or worse, and with no hesitation, my co-counsel and I
relied on these factors in selecting a jury. We wanted as many white
jurors as we could get. We exercised most of our peremptory chal-
lenges to excuse blacks.
What's a Diligent Defense Lawyer to Do?
The above stories, though remarkably symmetrical, are not other-
wise remarkable. Although I like to think of myself as an enlightened
16. See D.C. Code Ann. § 22-2403 (1981 & Supp. 1998). In the District of Colum-
bia, murder in the second degree carries a sentence of 20 years to life. See id. § 22-
2404. Manslaughter while armed carries a sentence of zero to 30 years, see id. § 22-
2405, with a mandatory minimum sentencing enhancement of five years, see id. § 22-
3202(a)(1).
17. The judge asked the following question: "The defendant is a white man who
was a medical student at the time of the incident. The decedent is an African Ameri-
can man who was homeless at the time of the incident. Is there anything about these
facts that would interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?"
Although several prospective jurors raised their hands in response to the question,
none specifically indicated that race was the issue. Most indicated that they had
strong feelings-positive and negative-about the homeless.
[Vol. 67
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criminal defense attorney 18 -and someone who believes that people
are more than their gender, race, or ethnicity-I recount these stories
without shame.' 9 I am a client-centered criminal defense advocate, 0
a partisan,21 and committed to representing my clients with devotion
and zeal.' In my view, I have no obligation as an attorney to fight
18. See generally Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical
Education of a Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L Rev. 1
(1993) [hereinafter Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School] (examining criminal
defense lawyering from the perspective of feminism and clinical legal education).
19. On the other hand, as a clinical law teacher, I do confess to feeling a little guilt.
It could be that in the course of teaching my students to be effective criminal defense
lawyers, I am teaching them to be prejudiced, or at least narrow-minded and reduc-
tive. I do what I can to avoid this, such as teaching through these issues in class, and
whispering a fierce-if condensed-lecture on the complexity of race, sex, class, and
ethnicity every time a student and I exercise a peremptory challenge based on these
factors in court. See infra Part III.
20. The concept of "client-centered lawyering" has many variations. The best
known model comes from the work of David Binder and Susan Price, see David A.
Binder & Susan C. Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client-Centered Ap-
proach (1977), and later David A. Binder, Paul Bergman, and Susan C. Price, see
David A. Binder et al., Lawyers As Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991)
[hereinafter Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors]. In the latter book, the authors
define client-centeredness as "an attitude of looking at problems from clients' per-
spectives, of seeing problems' diverse natures, and of making clients true partners in
the resolution of their problems." Binder at al., Lawyers as Counselors, supra, at xxi;
see also Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal ad Refine-
ment, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 501, 507 (1990) (defining client-centered counseling as enabling
clients to make their own decisions); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34
UCLA L. Rev. 717, 720 (1987) (describing a "client-centered practice" as one which
takes seriously the principle of client decision-making). At a minimum, client-cen-
tered lawyering means listening to clients. See Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors,
supra, at 4. At the other of the spectrum are those who argue that, to be client-
centered, lawyers should defer entirely to client "stories" in all substantive and strate-
gic decisions. See, eg., Binny Miller, Give Thein Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client
Narrative in Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485 (1994) (arguing that client narratives
ought to control decisions about case theory); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetori-
cal Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L
Rev. 1 (1990) (arguing that lawyers do clients a disservice when they pay more atten-
tion to law than to clients' stories). In my view, a client-centered and effective lawyer
may well consider and reject client stories. See Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Lait
School, supra note 18, at 27-37 (arguing that there is a middle ground between client-
centered and lawyer-centered decision-making).
For descriptions of client-centeredness as a component of zealous criminal defense,
see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1250-54 (1993) (discussing client-centered
justifications for zealous advocacy by public defenders) and Barbara Allen Babcock,
Defending the Guilty, 32 Clev. St. L. Rev. 175, 184 (1983-1984) [hereinafter Babcock,
Defending the Guilty] (discussing the criminal defense "tradition of unmitigated devo-
tion to the client's interest").
21. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L Rev.
589, 605 (1985) (acknowledging that "the case for undiluted partisanship is most com-
pelling" in criminal defense).
22. The first codification of the requirement of zeal in this country was in 1908. See
Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 15 (1908) (noting the lawyer's obligation to give
"entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and de-
fense of his rights and the exertion of [the lawyer's] utmost learning and ability"); see
19981
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cultural stereotypes unless they are being used against my client, or to
serve the interests of the broader community, unless this somehow
also serves my client.23
It is not that I believe that racial or demographic stereotypes are an
accurate proxy for the attitudes and life experience of all prospective
jurors. I do not.24 It is that, absent a meaningful exploration of the
also Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1969) ("A Lawyer Should
Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law"); Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1995) ("A lawyer should act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf."). For examinations of zealous advocacy with an emphasis on criminal de-
fense, see Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966) (examining zeal-
ous advocacy in the context of criminal defense); David Luban, Are Criminal Defend-
ers Different?, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1729, 1757-58 (1993) [hereinafter Luban, Criminal
Defenders] (same). See also Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics
65-86 (1990) [hereinafter Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics] (discussing the
ethic of zeal, which is "pervasive in lawyers' professional responsibilities"); David
Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 12 (1988) [hereinafter Luban, Lawyers
and Justice] ("[A] lawyer must, within the established constraints on professional be-
havior, maximize the likelihood that the client will prevail."); Babcock, Defending the
Guilty, supra note 20, at 184 (discussing the "tradition of unmitigated devotion to the
client's interest" in criminal defense); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4
Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1951-1952) (discussing the ethical standards of zeal and devotion to
client); David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Rela-
tionship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004, 1019 (1990) ("In the
criminal defense paradigm, adversary advocacy is a crucial device for protecting, and
indeed overprotecting, the rights of individuals against a powerful and potentially
dangerous bureaucratic institution.").
23. For the classic statement of this single-minded devotion to client, see Lord
Brougham's speech in 1 The Trial of the Queen of England in the House of Lords 16
(London, Thomas Kelly 1821) ("At present I hold [these dangerous and tremendous]
questions to be needless to the safety of my client; but when the necessity arrives, an
advocate knows but one duty, and, cost what it may, he must discharge it. Be the
consequences what they may, to any other persons, powers, principalities, dominions,
or nations, an advocate is bound to do his duty .... "). But see Anthony V. Alfieri,
Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1321 (1995) (noting that
"[n]either the Model Code nor the Model Rules expressly sanction the use of racial-
ized narratives").
24. See Abramson, supra note 7, at 171-76 (arguing that a juror's individual life
experience is more important than his or her race, gender, religion, national origin, or
age). Abramson is critical of the notion that any demographic characteristic can be a
proxy for who a prospective juror is:
[T]he ideal of a jury that represents different groups in the community is an
ideal that fosters cynicism when it comes to the practical parameters of jury
selection. All potential jurors, the [trial lawyer] manuals state, inevitably
bring with them the views and biases built into their race, religion, age, and
gender. These preconceptions supposedly influence the eventual verdict as
much, if not more than, the evidence presented at trial. The task of the law-
yer, therefore, is to outsmart the system-to figure out the demographics of
justice and to manipulate it during jury selection by eliminating jurors with
the so-called wrong personal characteristics.
Id. at 143 (footnote omitted); see also 1 National Jury Project, Inc., supra note 9,
§ 7.02[2][b], at 7-6 to 7-8 (observing that demographic characteristics are a factor in
jury selection when potential jurors presume the guilt of a defendant).
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latter,' I am stuck with the former, and it would be foolhardy or
worse not to at least consider the generalizations on which the stereo-
types are based.z6 Indeed, in this article, I argue that it is unethical for
a defense lawyer to disregard what is known27 about the influence of
race and sex on juror attitudes in order to comply with Batson v. Ken-
tucky and its progeny. a9 I argue that although Batson (and Georgia
v. McCollum,30 which extended the prohibition against race-based
peremptory challenges to criminal defendants) has spawned an "eth-
ics" of its own,3 1 this new ethics is at odds with other long-standing
and controlling ethical obligations of criminal defense lawyers. 2
In part II, I discuss the new ethics of jury selection derived from
Batson and its progeny. In part III, I examine the social science data
on race, gender, and juror attitudes, supplemented by my own experi-
ence as a criminal trial lawyer and teacher. In part IV, I argue that the
new ethics of jury selection ignore the impact of race and gender on
jurors' attitudes and thus are directly contrary to the mandate of zeal-
ous criminal defense and serve to disadvantage the criminally accused.
II. THE NEW ETHICS OF JURY SELECTION
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire
community. [Race-based] [s]election procedures . . . undermine
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.
-Batson v. Kentucky
33
25. See Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 20-27 (1997) (discussing the
deficiencies of voir dire as it is typically conducted); see also Nancy Gertner, Is the
Jury Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 923, 930 (1995) (reviewing Stephen J. Adler, The
Jury: Trial and Error in the American Courtroom (1994)) ("As long as voir dire is
limited and counsel is prevented from exploring juror predispositions in a meaningful
way, peremptory challenges are an important safety valve.").
26. See Abramson, supra note 7, at 171 ("[Social science data] generates probabil-
istic statements about the attitudes or biases of a specific group. Within limits, proba-
bilistic theorems may be of use to lawyers, enabling them to play the odds or make
educated bets.").
27. See infra Part ILI.A (discussing research on race, sex, and juror attitudes).
28. 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (holding that when prosecutors exercise peremptory
challenges based on race, they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
29. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (holding that the
exercise of peremptory challenges based on gender violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
30. 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that race-based peremptory challenges by de-
fense counsel violate the Equal Protection Clause).
31. See Abramson, supra note 7, at 175 (referring to the "new ethic" in jury selec-
tion created by Batson and J.E.B.); see also infra Part II (discussing the new ethics
under Batson, McCollum, and J.E.B.).
32. See infra Part IV (discussing the ethical requirement of zealous advocacy in
the context of jury selection).
33. 476 U.S. at 87.
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Just as public confidence in criminal justice is undermined by a con-
viction in a trial where racial discrimination has occurred in jury
selection, so is public confidence undermined where a defendant,
assisted by racially discriminatory peremptory strikes, obtains an
acquittal.
-Georgia v. McCollum
34
Since Batson.... [w]e have recognized... [a] right to jury selection
procedures that are free from state-sponsored group stereotypes
rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice....
... Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on
gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the indi-
vidual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the
judicial process.
-J.E.B. v. Alabama3
5
For practical purposes, the lawyers are the law.
-David Luban,
Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study
36
Nothing in the applicable rules, codes, and standards governing the
professional responsibility of criminal defense lawyers explicitly pro-
hibits race- or gender-based jury selection. 37 At best, the direction
provided by the ethical rules relating to race- or gender-based lawyer-
ing is ambiguous. 38 Until recently, most of the literature on criminal
34. 505 U.S. at 50.
35. 511 U.S. at 128, 140.
36. Luban, Lawyers and Justice, supra note 22, at xvii.
37. This is true of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, and the Standards Relating to the Administration of Crimi-
nal Justice: The Defense Function.
38. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 9-2 (1980) ("When
explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by
acting in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of
the legal system and the legal profession."). Any criminal lawyer worth his or her salt
would argue that employing all available legal means to thwart a prosecution, or at
least put it to the test, ensures the integrity of our legal system. See, e.g., Standards
Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard: The Defense Function § 1.1(b)
(1974) ("The basic duty the lawyer for the accused owes to the administration of jus-
tice is to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate, with courage, devotion and to
the utmost of his learning and ability, and according to law."); Michael E. Tigar, Set-
ting the Record Straight on the Defense of John Demjanjuk, Legal Times, Sept. 6, 1993,
at 22 (discussing what motivated him to zealously undertake the representation of an
alleged Nazi war criminal); cf. Alan M. Dershowitz, The Best Defense 411 (1982)
[hereinafter Dershowitz, Best Defense] (suggesting that the lack of zeal by defense
lawyers poses a greater threat to the criminal justice system than too much zeal). But
see Alfieri, supra note 23, at 1321 (remarking that neither the Model Code nor the
Model Rules "expressly sanction[s]" race-based advocacy).
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defense ethics had been silent on this question. 9 If a message can be
gleaned from most of the scholarship and commentary on criminal
defense, it is that jury selection is critical to the outcome of a criminal
trial,' and, in this, as in all things, the client comes first and every-
thing and everyone else be damned.41
This was the ethical landscape when, in 1986, the Supreme Court
decided Batson-a decision about which many defense lawyers
rejoiced4" because of its potential to prevent prosecutors from engi-
neering all-white jury trials.43 The pleasure, however, was short-lived.
First, it became clear that the new obstacles created by Batson
39. See, e.g., John M. Burkoff, Criminal Defense Ethics (1990) (setting forth ethi-
cal guidelines for criminal defense attorneys); Ethical Problems Facing the Criminal
Defense Lawyer (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995) (discussing ethical problems facing
criminal defense attorneys generally). But see Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense
Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 (1994) (examining
the ethics of relying on bias and stereotypes in criminal defense); Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Balancing Irictirn's Rights and Vigorous Advocacy for the Defendant, 1989 Ann. Surv.
Am. L. 135, 153-55 (proposing a code of conduct requiring a lawyer -not [to] ask
questions or behave in a manner which intentionally emphasizes or relies upon sex,
race, or national origin stereotypes when the question or behavior is designed to mis-
lead a jury or unfairly prejudice a witness or party").
40. See Abramson, supra note 7, at 143 ("There is a famous lawyers' quip about
the difference between trials in England and trials in the United States: in England,
the trial starts when jury selection is over, in the United States, the trial is already
over."); Babcock, Voir Dire, supra note 7, at 565 ("[,V]e should recognize voir dire as
the historically evolved, constitutionally important instrument that it is.").
41. See supra notes 20-22.
42. See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Dis-
crininatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am. Crim. L Rev. 1099, 1101 (1994)
[hereinafter Ogletree, Just Say No] ("Batson has been viewed as a major accomplish-
ment in the effort to eliminate this form of jury discrimination."); see also Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (heralding the case as a
"historic step toward eliminating the shameful practice of racial discrimination in the
selection of juries").
43. See generally Kennedy, supra note 25, at 204-08 (discussing the various views
underlying the Court's decision in Batson). As Kennedy noted,
Two beliefs animated the Batson decision. One was that prosecutors had
overused racially discriminatory peremptories-that they had too often ex-
ercised their privilege in a sloppy, unthinking, reflexive manner....
The second belief animating Batson eclipses the first. This belief is that
racial discrimination by the government in the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges is not only bad when used to disenfranchise black potential jurors
consistently but also when used as a trial-related tactic in a single instance.
I& at 205.
There is a long history of prosecutors excusing African American jurors from crimi-
nal cases involving African American defendants. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103-04
(Marshall, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion in Batson, Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall provided statistics from Missouri, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Texas which
indicate the widespread prosecutorial practice of striking black jurors. For example,
as Justice Marshall noted, "[iun 100 felony trials in Dallas County in 1983-1984, prose-
cutors peremptorily struck 405 out of 467 eligible black jurors; the chance of a quali-
fied black sitting on a jury was 1 in 10, compared to 1 in 2 for a white." Id. at 104
(Marshall, J., concurring).
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were not much harder for prosecutors to overcome 44 than those
that existed under previous law.45 Then, in Georgia v. McCoium,46
the Court ruled that Batson applied to criminal defendants
as well as prosecutors.47 Two years later, the Court extended
44. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 105-07 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting the difficulties
defendants have in demonstrating a prima facie case of juror discrimination based on
numbers alone and in otherwise attributing to prosecutors a racial motive); see also
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 170-80, 199-201
(1989) (discussing prima facie proof of a discriminatory purpose and the
"unconstitutionality" of the peremptory challenge); Deborah L. Forman, What
Difference Does it Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA Women's L.J. 35, 56-67
(1992) (discussing practical problems with applying Batson to gender discrimination);
Ogletree, Just Say No, supra note 42, at 1105-13 (discussing the failure of lower courts
to consistently apply Batson); Alan Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower
Court Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 Willamette L. Rev. 293 (1989)
(discussing lower courts' implementation of Batson); Stephen R. DiPrima, Note,
Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials After Batson and McCollum, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 888, 903-14 (1995) (discussing the application of Batson and McCollum by the
federal courts); Andrew G. Gordon, Note, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A Proposed
Ethical Rule Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62 Fordham L. Rev.
685, 693-710 (1993) (examining the many ways in which prosecutors can engage in
pretextual reasoning under Batson); David D. Hopper, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and
the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection?.
74 Va. L. Rev. 811, 836-39 (1988) (discussing systematic alterations to the Batson
analysis).
45. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222-23 (1965) (holding that in order for a
criminal defendant to demonstrate purposeful discrimination in jury selection he or
she must show that prosecutors had established a peremptory challenge system for
excluding black jurors). One court called this test "Mission Impossible." McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984). The Batson court rejected Swain's "crip-
pling burden of proof." Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
46. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
47. See id. at 59 ("[T]he exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on
either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by [either] party."). Justice
Thurgood Marshall articulated this position in his concurring opinion in Batson: "Our
criminal justice system 'requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused,
but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the
scales are to be evenly held."' Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). In Batson, Justice Marshall was
unmoved by the argument that defendants' peremptories are different, and that the
unfettered exercise of defense peremptory challenges is essential to obtaining a fair
and impartial jury. He derided the suggestion that there is any historical significance
to defendants' peremptory challenges. "Much ink has been spilled regarding the his-
toric importance of defendants' peremptory challenges." Id. at 108 (Marshall, J., con-
curring). He would rather have eliminated peremptory challenges altogether than
allow jury discrimination: "If the prosecutor's peremptory challenge could be elimi-
nated only at the cost of eliminating the defendant's challenge as well, I do not think
that would be too great a price to pay." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
Interestingly, Justice Clarence Thomas, not generally known for his concern for the
rights of minorities, the poor, or the criminally accused, expressed deep concern about
limiting a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges precisely because of preju-
dice against poor, black defendants. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Cul-
ture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 21, 51
(1993) [hereinafter Johnson, Language and Culture]. He recognizes who will bear the
burden of the new ethics of jury selection:
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those rulings to apply to gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges.48
Although Batson, McCollum, and J.E.B. are constitutionally driven,
they express a deep concern about professional ethics and institutional
values.49 The cases raise questions about what lawyers ought to be
able to do and how far lawyers should go within the adversary sys-
tem. 0 They address concerns about the integrity and legitimacy of
the justice system." They offer the Court's view of what it means for
I doubt that this [ruling] will produce favorable consequences. On the con-
trary, I am certain that black criminal defendants will rue the day that this
Court ventured down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of
peremptory strikes.
... [This Court has] observed that the racial composition of a jury may
affect the outcome of a criminal case.... "It is well known that prejudices
often exist against particular classes in the community, which sway the
judgement of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to
persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others
enjoy." We thus recognized, over a century ago, the precise point that Jus-
tice O'Connor makes today. Simply stated, securing representation of the
defendant's race on the jury may help to overcome racial bias and provide
the defendant with a better chance of having a fair trial.
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 60-61 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (citing and
quoting Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880)); see supra note 93. In contrast
to Justice Marshall, who wanted the law of jury selection to conform to a nondiscrimi-
natory ideal, Justice Thomas is a realist here, concerned more with how people are
than how he would like them to be. "[Clonscious and unconscious prejudice persists
in our society and... it may influence some juries. Common experience and common
sense confirm this understanding." Id. at 61.
48. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
49. See Abramson, supra note 7, at 175 (referring to the "new ethic the Supreme
Court set for jury selection when it outlawed race- or sex-based peremptory chal-
lenges"); cfJ Timothy Kaine, Race, Trial Strategy and Legal Ethics, 24 U. Rich. L Rev.
361, 373 (1990) ("Nothing in the Batson opinion discusses the ethical acceptability of
racially based trial strategy."). At least one commentator notes the tension between
existing ethical rules and the Constitutional law created by Batson. See Ogletree, Just
Say No, supra note 42, at 1104 ("Striking jurors on the basis of race or gender is not
always an irrational act; it can sometimes be ... in keeping with the litigant's goals
... ."). Unfortunately, Professor Ogletree fails to fully examine the values on both
sides of the equation and resolves the matter by asserting that some values are just
more important than others. See id. ("[Race- and gender-based challenges] would
simply be part of effective advocacy were it not entirely repugnant to the values and
standards of the Constitution, values that should and do override the litigant's interest
in winning.").
50. See McCollwn, 505 U.S. at 57 (finding that defense law2yers are limited to
"lawful, legitimate conduct," and, hence, may not exercise peremptory challenges on
the basis of race).
51. See id. ("It is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to
discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race."); Batson, 476 U.S. at
87 (asserting that when prospective jurors are struck on the basis of race the public
loses faith in the justice system).
Given the common practice of prosecutors of resisting full compliance with Batson,
see supra note 44,-a practice shared by many defense lawyers in the face of a "re-
verse Batson challenge"-the "ethics" and "values" promoted by Batson and its prog-
eny may well be hypocrisy and subterfuge. This is unfortunate but unsurprising in
view of the intensely adversarial nature of most criminal trials. In my view, it would
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lawyers to "do the right thing"52 as citizens as well as members of the
Bar.
In accordance with these cases, there is an increasing number of
scholars who argue that the persistence of racial and sexual stereotyp-
ing in court is the fault of lawyers,53 and has an enormous social cost.
54
Some have proposed ethical rules to address the problem.55
promote fairness and candor if prosecutors were required to comply with Batson as a
matter of constitutional law and professional ethics, see Standards Relating to the
Admin. of Criminal Justice: The Prosecution Function § 1.1(c) (1974) ("The duty of
the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."), and defense lawyers were
relieved of this burden entirely because of the different role that defense lawyers fill.
See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 63-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Luban, Criminal Defend-
ers, supra note 22, at x.
52. See Do The Right Thing (Forty Acres and a Mule Filmworks 1989). Spike
Lee's provocative film about racial tension in a Brooklyn neighborhood, in which race
is a defining experience, has much to offer those contemplating race and jury
selection.
53. See Kennedy, supra note 25, at 256-77, 284-95 (examining appeals to race by
both prosecutors and defense lawyers). See generally Alfieri, supra note 23 (arguing
against race-based defense theories).
54. See Alfieri, supra note 23, at 1342 ("[T]o deny, exploit, and ultimately demean
race in the name of advocacy wounds our clients, their communities, and ourselves.").
55. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the
Court: Why the First Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Eth-
nic Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 781, 785 (1996) (proposing to
amend Model Rule 8.4 to include the following: "It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to ... commit, in the course of representing a client, any verbal or physical
discriminatory act, on account of race, ethnicity, or gender, if intended to intimidate
litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, opposing counsel or other lawyers, or to
gain a tactical advantage.") (emphasis added); Gordon, supra note 44, at 713 ("A
lawyer shall not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin
against a member of the venire during jury selection." (citing Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 3.1.5)); cf Yaroshefsky, supra note 39, at 153 ("A code of con-
duct could state that 'a lawyer shall not ask questions or behave in a manner which
intentionally emphasizes or relies upon sex, race, or national origin stereotypes when
the question or behavior is designed to mislead a jury or unfairly prejudice a witness
or party."').
One proposed ethical rule was created from the concerns expressed in Batson.
Discrimination in the jury selection process has no place in our judicial pro-
cess. The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges not only harms liti-
gants and the excluded juror but undermines public confidence in our
judicial system. Thus, a lawyer exercising peremptory challenges in a dis-
criminatory manner suggests an inability to fulfill the lawyer's professional
role as a public citizen concerned with the fair administration of justice.
Gordon, supra note 44, at 713 (citations omitted).
At least sixteen states and the District of Columbia have passed ethical rules
prohibiting lawyers from engaging in discriminatory conduct. See Taslitz & Styles-
Anderson, supra note 55, at 781 n.4. Other states are actively considering adopting
such a rule. See id. at 782 n.6.
At least one commentator proposed changing the Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
Pam Frasher, Fulfilling Batson and its Progeny: A Proposed Amendment to Rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to Attain a More Race- and Gender-Neutral
Jury Selection Process, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1327, 1345-51 (1995) (proposing to limit the
number of peremptory challenges and allowing more attorney-conducted voir dire).
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There is no question that there are some compelling reasons to end
race and sex discrimination in jury selection.56 As the Supreme Court
dramatically put it, it "denigrates the dignity"-7 of African Americans
and women to be excluded from jury service simply because of race or
gender, and "reinvokes a history of exclusion from political participa-
tion."58 In addition, it sends a message to "all those in the courtroom,
and all those who may later learn of the discriminatory act ... that
certain individuals, for no reason other than gender [or race] are pre-
sumed unqualified... to decide important questions upon which rea-
sonable persons could disagree."59
56. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994) (observing
that discrimination based on gender causes harm to "the litigants, the community, and
the individual jurors"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (stating that, for
example, "[tihe petit jury has occupied a central position in our adversary system of
justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime against the arbitrary exercise of
power by prosecutor or judge"). Racism in jury selection has a long and shameful
history. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 882-97 (1994). See generally Kennedy,
supra note 25, at 68-180; Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and
Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 511: Douglas L
Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Anendment as a Prohibition Against
the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1990). For a poignant
account of the exclusion from jury service of an African American who had been a
decorated soldier in the Spanish-American War, see J. Anthony Lukas, Big Trouble
139 (1997). Lukas writes:
When [J. Gordon] MacPherson was accepted by both sides, the eleven white
jurors objected to serving on a jury, and thus being forced to associate inti-
mately, with a black man. Ultimately, the judge removed MacPherson. The
former corporal, among the first men to reach the crest of San Juan Hill, felt
his humiliation keenly. "I'm an American citizen," he said, "I fought for the
country and went through yellow fever in Cuba in the service of this country.
I wonder how many of those who have treated me this way have done as
much for the country."
Id.
Sexism in jury selection has its own ignoble history. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 131-35
(discussing the exclusion of women from American juries until the 20th century); id.
at 132 (noting that the prohibition of women serving on juries came from English
common law and the doctrine of propter defectum serus, or the "defect of sex" (quot-
ing 2 Blackstone, supra note 1, *362)); see also Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the
Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Senice, 61 U. Cin. L Rev. 1139 (1993) (analyz-
ing whether peremptory challenges of women due to their gender should be prohib-
ited based on Batson's reasoning).
57. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142; see also id. ("Striking individual jurors on the assump-
tion that they hold particular views simply because of their gender is practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority." (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted)).
58. Id.; see also Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 Win. & Mary Bill Rts.
J. 29, 56-61 (1994) (discussing jury service as an important aspect of citizenship).
59. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142; see also Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race.Conscious
Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical
Puzzle, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1177 (1994) (examining the effects of race-conscious
jury selection on public perceptions of fairness).
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Even if we agree that social justice6" might be advanced by prohibit-
ing certain legal practices, however, this does not resolve the question
of professional ethics or, for that matter, procedural fairness. To
some, justice would be advanced by forbidding lawyers from engaging
in any sort of meaningful advocacy in certain circumstances. 61 To
others, justice would be advanced by abrogating the most fundamen-
tal procedural rights of the accused.6 2
Ethics do not require a lawyer to advance some broad notion of
social justice. This applies to lawyers engaged in civil as well as crimi-
nal practice. Consider corporate lawyers, whose main obligation is to
preserve the rights of the rich and powerful against the poor and pow-
60. There is, of course, a question about what we mean by "social justice." In my
view, unbridled partisanship on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant is consistent
with a quest for both individual and social justice. In attempting to preserve my cli-
ents' liberty against an increasingly overreaching, bent-on-incarceration government,
I believe I am pursuing both my clients' immediate interest and a broader social jus-
tice goal. Others disagree. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 23, at 1301-06 (critiquing the
narrow role and narrow-minded approach of criminal defense lawyers). Alfieri sug-
gests that criminal defense lawyers are only concerned about our clients' narrow
"legal identity," and not their "social identity." Id. at 1307. He proposes that criminal
defense lawyers take on a "community-centered obligation" of "race-conscious re-
sponsibility" in order to "shape ... a client's social identity." Id.
61. See, e.g., Luban, Lawyers and Justice, supra note 22, at 151-52 (arguing that
criminal defense lawyers should not be allowed to humiliate rape complainants
through a cross-examination that suggests they were willing sexual partners). Luban
maintains this position whether or not the complainant's accusation of rape is truthful.
[T]he cross-examination is morally wrong, even if the victim really did con-
sent to sex with the defendant. Just as the rights of the accused are not
diminished when he is guilty, the right of women to invoke the state's aid
against rapists without fear of humiliation does not diminish when a
wom[an] abuses it by making a false accusation. This implies that balancing
the defendant's rights against the rape accuser's rights in order to determine
the moral bounds of zealous advocacy must be done without considering
either the defendant's guilt or the accuser's innocence. What's good for the
gander is good for the goose.
Id. at 152; see also Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975) (arguing that our system of adversarial advocacy ought to
be modified in order to pursue the truth); Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's
"Different Mission". Reflections on the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 125 (1987) (arguing that criminal defense lawyers should not be able to
put forward a false defense).
62. See, e.g., Harold J. Rothwax, Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice 35-120,
186-221 (1996) (arguing that Miranda ought to be overruled, the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments eviscerated, the requirement of unanimous verdicts abolished,
and speedy trial requirements lifted).
Some seemingly benign reform proposals would also abrogate fundamental princi-
ples underlying our justice system. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, With Justice for
Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials 241-58 (1995) [hereinafter Fletcher, With
Justice for Some] (arguing for a greater role for victims in criminal trials).
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erless. These lawyers may well be thwarting social justice,63 but they
cannot be said to be unethical.'
In the criminal sphere, there are competing "ethical regimes. '
Aside from specific ethical obligations that may conflict with a broad
notion of social justice,66 most criminal lawyers represent the poor.67
There is a compelling argument that criminal lawyers who zealously
represent the indigent accused are working for social change as well as
social justice by challenging both the "maldistribution of political
power in America ... [and] the maldistribution of wealth." S In my
view, criminal lawyers are not only ethical, but they are highly moral
actors 69 when they seek to thwart the prevailing legal regime on behalf
of those who bear the brunt of law's violence.70
63. See Luban, Lawyers and Justice, supra note 22, at 237 (noting Justice Louis
Brandeis's "fear that the 'corporation lawyer' was engaged in a form of practice that
had as its ultimate effect the enhancement of private wealth at the expense of the
public good ....").
64. For a powerfully argued book that calls for lawyers to "make the law more
just" and to engage in "moral activism," see id. at xvii, xxii. In the book, Luban
discusses Justice Brandeis's notion of a "people's lawyer," who, in contrast to lawyers
working for large corporations, would "take the have-nots as clients and work to
change the system along the lines of a progressive redistribution." Id. at 237.
For a gripping nonfiction account of a legal battle that pitted powerless members of
a community dying from leukemia against big corporations and their lawyers, see
Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action (1995).
65. Alfieri, supra note 23, at 1320.
66. See infra Part IV.
67. See Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50
Mercer L. Rev. (forthcoming 1999).
68. Luban, Lawyers and Justice. supra note 22, at 237 (paraphrasing Brandeis).
69. See generally Smith & Montross, supra note 67.
70. See generally Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992)
(discussing the impact of violence on the law). As Sarat and Kearns write in the
Introduction to this fine collection of essays. "violence, as a fact and a metaphor, is
integral to the constitution of modern law, and that law is a creature of both literal
violence, and of imaginings and threats of force, disorder, and pain." Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns, Introduction to Law's Violence, supra, at 1, 1 (citations omitted).
This is so in this country as well as in more notoriously violent ones: "Constitutional,
democratic, humane legal orders are distinguishable from their lawless, authoritarian,
and barbaric counterparts by the ways they authorize and use the coercive force at
their disposal.... Yet constitutional violence is violence nonetheless; it crushes and
kills with a steadfastness equal to a violence undisciplined by legitimacy." Id. at 5; see
also Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale LJ. 1601, 1601 (1986) ("[All]
[liegal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others: A
judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his free-
dom, his property, his children, even his life."); Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, A
Journey Through Forgetting: Toward a Jurisprndence of Violence, in The Fate of Law
211 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991) ("[Tlhe general link between law
and violence and the ways that law manages to work its lethal will, to impose pain and
death while remaining aloof and unstained by the deeds themselves, is still an unex-
plored and hardly noticed mystery in the life of the law.").
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The new ethics of jury selection embrace a worthy ideal, but one
that is lofty and Platonic, as well.71 The new ethics share much with
those who believe that law should reflect the "color-blind" society in
which we live.71 The problem is that we do not live in a color-blind-
or, for that matter, gender-blind-society and citizens, no matter how
well-intentioned, do not suddenly abandon racist or sexist attitudes
when summoned for jury duty.73
The lofty idealism of the new ethics sits uncomfortably in the rough
and tumble world of criminal defense. An alternative and, I think,
equally ethical position acknowledges the very real context in which
criminal jury selection takes place. At worst, my position could be
called a cynical sort of legal ethics; at best, it is pragmatic and wise and
serves to redress a continuing inequity.74
With regard to this alternative ethical framework, it is important to
note that we live in an increasingly punitive society,75 one that offers
little compassion to criminal wrongdoers. 76 It is also important to rec-
71. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(referring to the "ideal of nondiscriminatory jury selection we espoused in Batson").
72. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 25, at 237-55 (arguing against jury reforms in-
tended to increase the number of blacks on juries). Although Professor Kennedy
concedes that "race matters" in the administration of criminal justice, id. at 252, he
bridles at the suggestion that we fashion policies or practices that explicitly recognize
race in the criminal law. See id. At the heart of Professor Kennedy's embrace of
color-blindness in the criminal law is a well of optimism about race in America:
Perhaps the most fundamental way in which I differ from at least some of
those who back the reforms I oppose is that I believe that racial conflict is
not inevitable, that it can be overcome, and that a morally good and politi-
cally realistic way to help in doing so is to decline to formalize race-minded-
ness in jury selection.
Id. For a trenchant critique of Professor Kennedy's position on color-blindness, see
Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 1270 (1998).
73. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is by now clear
that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minor-
ity defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict
of guilt or innocence."); see also id. at 60-61 (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with
Justice O'Connor and noting that the press regularly reports the number of white and
black jurors in high profile cases, reflecting a recognition that racial prejudice is a fact
of life).
74. See Abramson, supra note 7, at 127-31 (analogizing to affirmative action).
75. See Marc Mauer & Tracy Huling, Young Black Americans and the Criminal
Justice System: Five Years Later 1 (The Sentencing Project ed., 1995) (finding that
one in three African American males are currently under the supervision of the crimi-
nal justice system, either in prison or jail, or on probation or parole); Fox Butterfield,
Crime Keeps on Falling, but Prisons Keep on Filling, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1997, at DI
(noting that the rate of incarceration continues to rise despite the decrease in crime
rates). See generally Lois G. Forer, A Rage to Punish: The Unintended Consequences
of Mandatory Sentencing (1994) (discussing the effects of mandatory sentencing
laws).
76. See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Haunted Juror Tells of a Divided Panel Deciding for
Death, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1998, at Al (reporting that, in the first capital murder trial
in New York since the reinstatement of the death penalty, jurors believed that the
horror of the crime outweighed the defendant's prior heroism as a prison guard, prior
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ognize that attitudes about race and crime are difficult to disentan-
gle.77 Although race is perhaps more complicated, we are not better
at dealing with gender than we are with race.7"
It cannot be unethical for criminal defense lawyers to recognize that
there is something different about representing an accused, or that
there is something uniquely burdensome, distinctly challenging, and
sometimes even frightening about selecting a jury to judge an accused.
It cannot be unethical for criminal defense lawyers to act in conform-
ity with the understanding that most jurors do not accept the pre-
sumption of innocence or the right of a defendant not to testify
without adverse inference.79 It cannot be wrong for defense lawyers
to do what they have to do to make a tough fight a slightly fairer one.
It is simply not so that a concern about social justice, which often
translates into a concern about the needs and interests of the larger
"community," "public," or "society,"80 must always trump individual
rights."' Not only is the Bill of Rights supposed to ensure that this
lack of criminal record, and mother's plea for mercy); Sam Howe Verhovek. As Texas
Executions Mount. They Grow Routine, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1997, at Al (reporting
the record number of executions occurring in Texas in 1997, where "the death penalty
is becoming a matter of routine").
77. See, e.g., Studs Terkel, Race: How Blacks and Whites Think and Feel About
the American Obsession 268 (1992) ("I'm driving with my nine-year-old boy. Here's
a black guy crossing the street. A street-looking guy. He breaks into a fast run to
make the traffic, and my nine-year-old says, 'Looks like he's running from the
police."').
78. See Barbara J. Gazeley, Venus, Mars, and the Law: On Mediation of Sexual
Harassment Cases, 33 Willamette L. Rev. 605, 621 (1997) ("Sexual harassment law
remains a work in process.").
79. See 1 National Jury Project, Inc., supra note 9, § 2.06, at 2-43 to 2-57.
80. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 4-5
(1993) (discussing how social judgments about crime are made). As Friedman notes:
"Society" is another abstraction; what we mean is that these are collective
decisions. Not everybody is part of the collective that makes the decision.
When we say "society" we really mean those who call the tunes and pay the
piper; it would be worse than naive to imagine that everybody's opinion
counts the same, even in a country that is supposed to be democratic....
The rich and powerful, the articulate, the well positioned, have many more
"votes" on matters of definition than the poor, the weak. the silent.
Id.
81. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 70 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("In the interest of promoting the supposedly greater good of race relations in the
society as a whole. . . we use the Constitution to destroy the ages-old right of criminal
defendants to exercise peremptory challenges as they wish, to secure a jury that they
consider fair.").
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never happens, 2 but there are times when individual justice leads to
social justice. 3
It may also be in keeping with a broad notion of social justice-it
may be doing the right thing-to choose the individual dignity of an
accused8 4 over the individual dignity of a prospective juror. The ac-
cused has absolutely everything on the line: his or her freedom, repu-
tation, and, in a rapidly growing number of cases, his or her life. Even
if we concede that a prospective juror has some kind of dignity inter-
est, how can this interest compare to that of the accused? However
insulted or diminished a prospective juror might feel as a result of not
being selected for a jury on account of race or gender, it is a fleeting
experience compared to that of the accused."' In the end, the rejected
juror at least gets to go home. 6
Let me be clear. I am not suggesting that Batson be overruled. I
believe Batson is good law and, when decided, was a marked improve-
82. See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution from a Progressive Point of View, in A
Less Than Perfect Union 40, 47-49 (Jules Lobel ed., 1988) (suggesting that the protec-
tions provided by the Bill of Rights were more "aspirational" than actual). For a
brilliant expos6 of the fragility of the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, see
Richard Harris, Freedom Spent (1976).
83. For an example, see Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the "Battered
Woman's Defense:" Towards a New Understanding, 19 Fordham Urb. L.J. 567, 571
(1992) (describing State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977), which held that jury
instructions using only the masculine tense implicitly violated the female defendant's
equal protection rights, as a "pivotal advance for women in the context of self-defense
cases").
84. As Monroe Freedman has repeatedly noted, the bedrock concern of a zealous,
devoted criminal lawyer is the client's dignity. See Freedman, Understanding Law-
yers' Ethics, supra note 22, at 6-10, 13-17, 43-64. In jury selection, the peremptory
challenge enhances a defendant's dignity by allowing the defendant to believe that his
or her case is being tried by an impartial jury. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219
(1965) (remarking that "the peremptory satisfies the rule that 'to perform its high
function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice"' (quoting In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))); Babcock, Voir Dire, supra note 7, at 552.
85. See Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School, supra note 18, at 43-45 (rejecting
David Luban's view that it causes more harm to allow a rape complainant to be sexu-
ally ridiculed than to allow a wrongful rape conviction). Just as I believe there is "no
comparison between being called a whore and being imprisoned for ten years for
something you didn't do," id. at 45, I think there is no comparison between feeling
bad about not being selected to serve on a jury and being convicted by a hostile or
biased jury. But see Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Se-
lection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway? 92 Colum. L. Rev. 725, 727 (1992) ("The Ameri-
can jury is universally understood as an important institution of democratic
government. Exclusion of any person from such an institution by reason of race does
violence to centrally important constitutional ideals .... In this respect, exclusion of
jurors is like exclusion of voters .... ); cf. John Guinther, The Jury in America at xiii
(1988) (noting that Thomas Jefferson once declared the right to a jury trial "more
precious to the maintenance of a democracy than even the vote").
86. For a thoughtful discussion of peremptory challenges and the roles of the jury
as both a social institution and the protector of parties' rights, see Nancy S. Marder,
Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 Tex. L. Rev,
1041 (1995).
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ment over what preceded it.' I believe that the requirements of Bat-
son are consistent with a prosecutor's "uniquely high standard of
conduct' in criminal trials, and the obligation to seek justice, not
convictions.89 The problem with Batson is that it is so easily overcome
by prosecutors.90
87. But see Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue
Transfers, 53 Md. L. Rev. 107, 127 (1994) [hereinafter Brown, The Role of Race] (criti-
cizing Batson for recognizing that race makes a difference and then denying litigants
the opportunity to strike a prospective juror based upon racial bias); Ogletree, Just
Say No, supra note 42, at 1100-13 (discussing the ways in which Batson is routinely
undermined).
88. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The [prosecutor) is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty...
whose interest.., in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done."); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1969);
Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard: The Prosecution
Function § 1.1(c) (1974).
90. See Kennedy, supra note 25, at 208-14 (noting the enormous deference judges
give to prosecutors when enforcing Batson, and citing examples of "blatant lying" by
prosecutors and "fudging" by both prosecutors and judges); Brand, supra note 56, at
583-96 (examining Batson's inability to identify or eliminate race-based challenges);
Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned about Batson and Per-
emptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 459 (1996) (finding that, between
1986 and 1993, there were 165 cases in which judges ruled that prosecutors had vio-
lated Batson, approximately 10% of the 1101 cases brought by criminal defendants
alleging the racially motivated prosecutorial exercise of peremptory challenges); Jere
W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Un-
fortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 DePaul
L. Rev. 625, 629-35 (1994) (reporting post-Batson cases in which prosecutors success-
flly asserted nonracial grounds for peremptories); Michael J. Raphael & Edward J.
Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral E-rplanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U.
Mich. J. L. Reform 229 (1993); Gordon, supra note 44, at 693-709 (examining exam-
ples of pretext in the proffered reasons for peremptory challenges under Batson). For
a judicial perspective on the lackluster enforcement of Batson by trial courts, see
United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1989) (Higginbotham,
J., concurring) ("I have been disturbed ... by a series of other cases where the Batson
issue has been raised and where superficial or almost frivolous excuses for peremp-
tory challenges with racial overtones have been proffered and accepted .... [Clourts
must take seriously our responsibilit[ies] [under Batson].").
Some prosecutors apparently conduct training sessions on how to circumvent Bat-
son. The disclosure of a videotaped training session in which a senior Philadelphia
prosecutor-who was running for District Attorney-urged his younger colleagues to
exclude jurors on the basis of race, class, and educational stereotypes caused a public
scandal. See Michael Janofsky, Under Siege, Philadelphia's Criminal Justice System
Suffers Another Blow, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1997, at A14 (discussing the revelation
that a former Philadelphia prosecutor running for District Attorney trained other
prosecutors to exercise race-based peremptory challenges). It is not at all clear that
the former prosecutor was acting unethically. Compare Stuart Taylor, Jr., Selecting
Juries; Dumb and Dumber, Legal Times, Apr. 14, 1997, at 33 ("McMahon's video
suggests that in Philadelphia, at least, some prosecutors think ... that they could get
away with cynically circumventing Batson"), with Michael Matza, Jury's Out on
Whether Ethics Were Violated, Phila. Inquirer, Apr. 2, 1997, at 1 (finding a range of
opinions on the ethics of training prosecutors to consider race in jury selection), and
Michael Matza & Mark Fazlollah, Juries and Justice, Phila. Inquirer, Apr. 6, 1997, at
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I take issue with McCollum, which I believe was wrongly decided.9'
Not only do I share the view of the dissenters that it is absurd to char-
acterize the conduct of a criminal defendant as "state action,""2 but I
believe that limiting a defendant's use of peremptory challenges often
leads to less, not more, racially diverse juries.93 As the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund explained in its amicus brief in
McCollum:
The ability to use peremptory challenges to exclude majority race
jurors may be crucial to empanelling a fair jury. In many cases an
African American, or other minority defendant, may be faced with
a jury array in which his racial group is underrepresented to some
degree, but not sufficiently to permit challenge under the Four-
teenth Amendment. The only possible chance the defendant may
have of having any minority jurors on the jury that actually tries him
will be if he uses his peremptories to strike members of the majority
race.
94
El (quoting the former prosecutor as saying that the techniques he recommended
were "realistic" not "racist").
91. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62-69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Michael J.
Desmond, Limiting a Defendant's Peremptory Challenges: Georgia v. McCollum and
the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 389 (1993).
92. See 505 U.S. at 69-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the assertion that
"[a] criminal defendant, in the process of defending himself against the state, is held
to be acting on behalf of the state" as absurd); id. at 63-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(critiquing the idea that defendants or defense lawyers are state actors).
93. See id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (disputing the notion that "leaving
criminal defendants and their attorneys free to make racially motivated peremptory
challenges will undermine the ideal of nondiscriminatory jury selection . . ."). As
Justice O'Connor wrote:
Considered in purely pragmatic terms ... the Court's holding may fail to
advance nondiscriminatory criminal justice. It is by now clear that conscious
and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive . . . the
verdict of guilt or innocence .... Using peremptory challenges to secure
minority representation on the jury may help to overcome such racial bias,
for there is substantial reason to believe that the distorting influence of race
is minimized on a racially mixed jury.... In a world where the outcome of a
minority defendant's trial may turn on the misconceptions or biases of white
jurors, there is cause to question the implications of this Court's good
intentions.
Id. at 68-69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 62 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting that "whether white defendants can use peremptory challenges to purge mi-
nority jurors presents quite different issues from whether a minority defendant can
strike majority group jurors") (citing Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc. as amicus curiae 3-4, McCollum (No. 91-372)).
Professor Sheri Johnson notes that "it is a strange case that makes Justices
O'Connor and Thomas the champions of defendant rights and the purveyors of dis-
cussion about unconscious racism." Johnson, Language and Culture, supra note 47, at
51. She agrees that it would be most beneficial for African American defendants and
defendants generally if Batson were law and McCollum had been decided differently.
See id.
94. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor J., dissenting) (citing Brief for NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., at 9-10, McCollum (91-372)). Importantly,
while Justice O'Connor cites with approval the amicus brief of the LDF, she does not
explicitly endorse the LDF position that black defendants should not be prohibited
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In other words, when criminal defendants, a disproportionate
number of whom are poor and nonwhite, exercise peremptory chal-
lenges with race in mind, they may be doing so for strategic reasons,
not bigoted ones. 95 Exercising peremptory challenges in a race-con-
scious manner does not necessarily mean exercising challenges in a
racist manner.96 Striking members of the majority race on behalf of a
minority accused may also be a form of "affirmative action"' in view
from using race-based peremptory challenges even if white defendants are prohibited.
See Kennedy, supra note 25, at 216-18; see also id. at 216 (noting the "fascinating and
unlikely alliance between Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice Clarence Thomas,
and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund" on the question of peremp-
tory challenges by minority defendants).
Kennedy derides the rhetoric employed by LDF to support its position as "senti-
mental obfuscation." Id. at 220. He argues that the black defendant who exercises
peremptory challenges to exclude whites in the hope of obtaining blacks on the jury is
not doing so "in order to empanel a fair jury or to enlarge opportunities for blacks to
participate in self-government through jury service... [, but] because... that strategy
will give him a better chance of escaping conviction." Id. Kennedy further argues
further that to allow black and not white defendants to make racially motivated per-
emptory challenges will lead to the same "difficulties, misunderstandings, resent-
ments, and countermobilizations that all other race lines have encountered." Id. at
227.
As I indicate in part 1, 1 do not share LDF's position that only black defendants
should retain a right to the unfettered exercise of peremptory challenges. See supra
Part I. I believe all defendants should retain this right.
95. See Kennedy, supra note 25, at 218 (commenting on the notion of "strategic as
opposed to prejudiced racial discrimination" in jury selection). As Professor Ken-
nedy notes:
It is simplistic to believe ... that racially discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges merely reflect prejudice, animosity. or unthinking habit. Bigotry or
reflexive allegiance to certain stereotypes surely explains why some attor-
neys racially discriminate in their use of peremptory challenges. On the
other hand, many attorneys, prosecutors as well as defense counsel, racially
discriminate in their deployment of peremptory challenges because they rea-
sonably believe that doing so redounds to the benefit of the side they
represent.
Id
96. See J. Alexander Tanford, Racism in the Adversary System: The Defendant's
Use of Peremptory Challenges, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1015, 1021-37 (1990) (arguing for
restricting racist peremptory challenges by defendants).
97. See Abramson, supra note 7, at 102 (discussing the notion of affirmative action
in jury selection); see also Nancy J. King, Racial Jurynandering: Cancer or Cure? A
Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 707
(1993) [hereinafter King, Racial Jurymnandering] (discussing a number of race-con-
scious procedures to ensure minority representation in juries and jury pools); cf
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the difference between government policies that seek to benefit minorities
and those that seek to maintain or perpetuate inequality). As Justice Stevens wrote:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subju-
gating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority.
Remedial race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to
foster equality in society.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of the historical exclusion of African Americans from juries,9' and in
view of what many regard as the overincarceration of African Ameri-
cans today.99
Thus, from an ethical and institutional perspective, the new ethics of
jury selection do little to enhance the way law works for those called
to sit in judgment of the accused, who are not especially ennobled by
the concept of "race blindness," and do even less for the accused, who
may well end up with a hostile jury. I now evaluate whether there is
some empirical basis to believe that race and gender have nothing to
do with being fair and impartial jurors.
III. THE NEW ETHICS AND JURY RESEARCH AND EXPERIENCE
The outcome of any jury trial is the collective judgment made by
twelve individuals. Each person's attitudes, opinions, and exper-
iences will affect the ways in which that individual evaluates a case
and arrives at a decision.
-National Jury Project, Inc. t °0
Race matters.
-Cornel West' 0 '
We know that like race, gender matters.
-Sandra Day O'Connor
in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.'0 2
98. See King, Racial Jurymandering, supra note 97, at 712-19 (discussing the rea-
sons why minorities have historically been and still are underrepresented on criminal
juries).
99. See Marc Mauer, The Sentencing Project, Young Black Men and the Criminal
Justice System: A Growing National Problem 9 (1990) (indicating that, in 1989, there
were more young African American men under the supervision of the criminal justice
system than there were African American men of all ages enrolled in higher educa-
tion); Mauer & Huling, supra note 75, at 3 (finding that nearly one in three young
black men are either in jail or prison or on probation or parole); National Center on
Institutions and Alternatives, Hobbling a Generation: Young African American
Males in Washington, D.C.'s Criminal Justice System: Five Years Later 1 (1997)
(finding that one out of two young African American men living in Washington, D.C.
are under the supervision of the criminal justice system); see also Butler, supra note
72, at 1280-82 (discussing the enormous social costs of the overincarceration of Afri-
can Americans and disputing the argument that disproportionate black incarceration
is the result of disproportionate black criminality).
100. 1 National Jury Project, Inc., supra note 9, § 1.03, at 1-7.
101. Cornel West, Race Matters 4 (1993) ("There is no escape from our interracial
interdependence, yet enforced racial hierarchy dooms us as a nation to collective
paranoia and hysteria-the unmaking of any democratic order.").
102. 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Carol Gilligan, In
a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 128-50 (1982)
(finding that women and men have different ethical systems arising from their differ-
ent experiences and perspectives).
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If race and gender significantly influence a prospective juror's atti-
tudes and life experience, then a defense lawyer who is appropriately
concerned about his or her client would be wise to take these factors
into consideration when selecting a jury. They might not be the only
factors to consider, but, if they indeed matter, it would be foolish to
fail to consider them. It would be bad lawyering; indeed, it would be
unethical defense lawyering.103
Studies on jury decision-making and the influence of race, gender,
and ethnicity"° are admittedly problematic. Some studies are better
than others. Most can be criticized for one failing or another.105 If the
103. See sources cited supra note 22.
104. I do not explicitly include ethnicity or class in this article for two reasons.
Frst, Batson has not yet been extended to prohibit peremptory challenges based on
these categories. Second, I believe that ethnicity and class are less discernable than
race and sex (even though race and sex can themselves be complicated) and, there-
fore, less influential. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jn-y, 83
Mich. L. Rev. 1611, 1697 (1985) [hereinafter Johnson, Black Innocence] ("Ethnicity,
unlike race, is most often not apparent to jurors, and thus usually could not be the
basis for distortion of judgment. More significantly, the empirical evidence provides
no support for the claim that ethnicity alters the attribution of guilt.").
Sheri Lynn Johnson's excellent article, see Johnson, Black Innocence, supra, on
which I have relied extensively, has been called "the most detailed recent analysis of
the effect of race on criminal jury decisionmaking." Laura T. Sweeney & Craig Ha-
ney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analvtic Review of Erperiniental
Studies, 10 Behav. Sci. & L. 179, 182 (1992). I share Professor Johnson's conclusion
that the race of jurors and defendants matters in jury decisionmaking. See generally
Johnson, Black Innocence, supra, at 1616-79 (discussing the influence of racial bias on
the determination of guilt).
105. See Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, The Myths and Realities of Attor-
ney Jury Selection Folklore and Scientific Jury Selection: What Works?, 17 Ohio N.U.
L. Rev. 229, 247-51 (1990) (criticizing several jury studies on the effect of race). But
see Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1617-18 (concluding that, while any
one jury study might have its shortcomings, when one looks at a range of jury studies
and general social psychology research it is clear that race influences some jury ver-
dicts); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 63, 129-30 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination] ("Jury studies belie declara-
tions that the effects of jury discrimination on jury decisions are insignificant or
unknowable."). See generally Abramson, supra note 7, at 143-76 (critiquing social sci-
ence research on the effect of juror demographics on evaluation of evidence and deci-
sion-making).
There are three types of research that pertain to the significance of race and gender
in jury decisionmaking: mock jury experiments and questionnaires based on case de-
scriptions; observations and statistics from real trials ("archival research"); and gen-
eral research on prejudice. See Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1617-18;
see also King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination, supra, at 75-77 (discuss-
ing studies that examined the influence of juror discrimination on jury decisions).
In mock jury experiments and questionnaires, researchers attempt to simulate trials
by presenting participants with evidence and asking them to make a determination
regarding guilt, while controlling and altering variables such as the nature of the
charges, the strength of the evidence, and the race or sex of defendants. Some criti-
cize these studies as having little application in the real world. See, e.g., King, Postcon-
viction Review of Jury Discrimination, supra, at 75-77 (discussing the significance of
differences between mock juries and real juries, including the lack of group delibera-
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methodology used is a mock jury, then it can always be said that the
experience of being a mock juror is like having "jury experience lite."
Whether the jury is mock or real, the studies depend on the candor
and self-knowledge of the responding jurors. 10 6 Whether mock or
real, the influence of race or gender is hard to tease out from a range
of other significant factors, including the strength of evidence, the tal-
ent of the lawyers, the evidentiary rulings and legal instructions of the
judge.10 7
tion, the lack of live testimony, and the predominance of college students on mock
juries); see also Ramsey McGowen & Glen D. King, Effects of Authoritarian, Anti-
Authoritarian, and Egalitarian Legal Attitudes on Mock Juror and Jury Decisions, 51
Psychol. Rep. 1067, 1072 (1982) (finding that "juries render more moderate decisions
than do individual jurors"); Peter J. Nelligan, The Effects of the Gender of Jurors on
Sexual Assault Verdicts, 72 Soc. & Soc. Res. 249, 249-50 (1988) (stating that "the
number of male and female jurors on rape-case juries is unrelated to the juries' pro-
pensity to convict"). Others point out that the absence of a voir dire process itself
poses a significant threat to validity. See Nelligan, supra, at 249-50. But see Johnson,
Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1640-43 (persuasively arguing that mock jury
studies have real world validity).
In archival studies, researchers survey jurors at the conclusion of the case in which
they were involved or examine already collected data in an attempt to connect certain
juror characteristics with the outcome of a trial. See Fulero & Penrod, supra, at 229,
249; Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1618. Archival research has been
criticized for lacking control over potentially significant variables. See Johnson, Black
Innocence, supra note 104, at 1618, 1643. Archival research has also been criticized
for distorting effects in certain types of cases. See Fulero & Penrod, supra, at 249.
They also tend to be older and fewer in number (this author mostly encountered
studies from the 1970s and earlier), and may not shed much light on juror attitudes
today.
General research on racial and gender prejudice tends to be dismissed as "soft"
social science and as having little relevance in the context of jury service. See Johnson,
Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1643 (noting that general research on racial preju-
dice cannot substitute for a more specific inquiry into the effects of racial bias on a
criminal jury). Still, this research supports the validity of the mock jury studies that
demonstrate a connection between the race of juror, race of defendant, and attribu-
tion of guilt. See id. at 1643-44.
106. See Abramson, supra note 7, at 150-51.
107. See id. at 145-46. Professor Abramson does not believe that race or gender arc
good predictors of anything in the complicated context of a jury trial:
My conclusions about this science of jury selection will be straightforward.
Empirically, there is no evidence that it works. There is no scientific way to
predict whether an individual juror will conform, in any one case, to the
general attitudes of his or her group. Moreover, even generalizations about
groups are of limited use in the jury context, because the behavior of jurors,
as well as the local community from which they are drawn, is so specific to
the particular case on trial. In the end, we all belong to so many overlapping
groups that science cannot forecast whether a juror will respond to the evi-
dence more, as say, a woman, a white, a thirty-year-old, a Lutheran, a Nor-
wegian, a college graduate, a member of the middle class, a Republican, or
whatever.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Walter F. Abbott, Surrogate Juries 2 (1990) (asserting
that the "overwhelming majority of jury verdicts is decided by the direction and
strength of the evidence and not by personal characteristics of triers-of-fact"); Harry
Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (1966) (concluding, tentatively, that
juries usually understand the facts and issues in cases); Shari Seidman Diamond, Sci-
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Drawing meaningful conclusions about jury selection from trial ex-
perience is equally problematic. Criminal trial lawyers, indeed, all
trial lawyers, often spout all sorts of theories about how to pick a
jury.' To them, it does not seem to matter that the theories are little
more than a combination of "intuition" and demographic stereotyping
and that the outcome of the trial or trials on which the theories are
based may have had little to do with eitherY°9 The outcome of a trial
entific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know and Do Not Know, 73 Judicature
178, 182 (1990) ("The focus on [scientific jury selection] neglects the key determinant
of trial outcomes: the evidence. In studies that have measured the contributions of
juror characteristics and trial testimony to jury verdicts, the trial testimony
dominates.").
108. See Fulero & Penrod, supra note 105, at 230-37 (cataloguing juror -types" by
occupation, gender, race or ethnicity, demeanor and appearance, religion, marital sta-
tus, and age); see also Michael Fried et al., Juror Selection. An Analysis of Voir Dire,
in The Jury System in America: A Critical Overview 47, 49 (Rita James Simon ed.,
1975) (providing a "theoretical framework within which to understand the conflicting
aims of prosecution and defense during voir dire").
109. See Abramson, supra note 7, at 146 ("Fascination with the supposed secrets of
jury selection is hardly new in the United States. Law yers have always relied on
hunches, intuition, and their ideas about stereotypes to distinguish proprosecution
jurors from prodefense jurors." (footnote omitted)); Fulero & Penrod, supra note 105,
at 237 ("Despite the conflicts in advice.... the fact that the advice is often based on
racial, sexual, ethnic, or other stereotypes, and ... that the advice is based on the
idiosyncratic experiences of the advisors rather than on more reliable forms of data,
this ... advice appears to have enduring currency .... "): see also Morton Hunt,
Putting Juries on the Couch, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1992, Magazine, at 70 (quoting
Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz: "Lawyers instincts are often the least trust-
worthy basis on which to pick jurors. All those neat rules of thumb, but no feedback.
Ten years of accumulated experiences may be 10 years of being %%Tong.").
For the most notorious example of demographic stereotyping as a theory of jury
selection, see Darrow, supra note 2. Darrow offers this advice on picking a criminal
jury:
You would be guilty of malpractice if you got rid of [an Irishman], except for
the strongest reasons.
An Englishman is not so good as an Irishman, but still, he has come
through a long tradition of individual rights, and is not afraid to stand alone:
in fact, he is never sure that he is right unless the great majority is against
him. The German is not so keen about individual rights except where they
concern his own way of life .... If he is a Catholic, then he loves music and
art; he must be emotional, and will want to help you ....
If a Presbyterian enters the jury box and carefully rolls up his umbrella,
and calmly and critically sits down, let him go. He is cold as the grave ....
Get rid of him with the fewest possible words before he contaminates the
others ....
If possible, the Baptists are more hopeless than the Presbyterians ....
The Methodists are worth considering, they are nearer the soil ....
Beware of the Lutherans, especially the Scandinavians: they are almost
always sure to convict ....
As to Unitarians, Universalists, Congregationalists, Jews and other agnos-
tics, don't ask them too many questions: keep them anyhow, especially Jews
and agnostics ....
Never take a wealthy man on a jury. He vill convict, unless the defendant
is accused of violating the anti-trust law ....
Id at 37, 211-12.
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can be traced to so many factors: the strength of evidence, the law-
yers' ability, the judge's rulings, and simple luck.
Still, there is something to be learned from research and experience.
Effective and ethical lawyers should not keep their heads in the sand.
Much of what is known is consistent with common sense.
A. Jury Research on Race and Gender
Although many find it troubling, and it is certainly contrary to the
idea of America as a melting pot, group identity is very strong in this
country.11 ° This is especially true when it comes to race.1 ' The ques-
tion is whether racial identity and its concomitant suspicions, stereo-
types, fears, and prejudices about those who are "different""' 2
influence people when they sit on juries.
It seems impossible for this not to be so.1" 3 If racial identity and
racial prejudice" 4 are as strong as they appear to be in the world, how
can they suddenly disappear in a courtroom?" 5 A juror's pledge to
110. See generally Eliot R. Smith & Diane M. Mackie, Social Psychology 169-263
(1995) (discussing the formation of group stereotypes and group identities). As a way
of organizing and understanding the world, we all categorize people based on socially
relevant characteristics such as race, gender, and ethnicity. This categorization leads
us to exaggerate both the similarities within groups and the differences among them.
See id. at 175-76.
111. See generally Terkel, supra note 77 (examining race through the comments and
experiences of Chicago residents). The idea that racial identity significantly influ-
ences juror decision-making is threatening to many. See Hunt, supra note 109 (re-
marking that the notion that race predisposes us to decide criminal cases in a certain
way threatens "our most cherished beliefs concerning the freedom of choice, the na-
ture of reasoning and the quality of justice dispensed by jury trials").
112. See generally Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exchsion,
and American Law (1990) (offering an introduction to the legal treatment of differ-
ence in a variety of contexts).
113. See Anna Quindlen, Across the Divide, in Thinking Out Loud 21, 22 (1993)
(noting that the members of the all-white jury who decided the state prosecution of
the officers in the Rodney King case "walked into that room with the baggage most
[whites] carry, the baggage of stereotypes and ignorance and pure estrangement from
African-Americans").
114. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckon-
ing with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 333 n.62 (1987) (defining prejudice
as "an attitude toward outgroups which refrains from reality-testing, not just because
the mental effort is too much, but because the attitude itself fulfills a specific irrational
function for its bearer" (citation omitted)).
115. See Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1644-45 (noting that there is
vast empirical proof that whites continue to have negative stereotypes of blacks, in-
cluding stereotypes of "dangerousness, unruliness, and criminal propensity"); see also
Kennedy, supra note 25, at 12-17 (discussing the association of crime with blackness),
Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identifica-
tion, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769, 1776 (1992) (discussing the romanticized image of
criminals among some young rap stars that prompts emulation); cf. J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Individuals are not
expected to ignore as jurors what they know as men[ I or women.").
One of the most famous studies demonstrating that most people tend to ascribe
negative, indeed, criminal, behavior to blacks was by Gordon Allport, author of the
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follow a judge's instructions and not let anything interfere with his or
her duty to apply the law, no matter how genuine, simply cannot over-
come more deep-seated and often unconscious beliefs and feelings. 16
There are two critical findings pertaining to race and ethnicity that
ought to inform criminal defense lawyers in selecting a jury. One is
that in assessing legal responsibility, we tend to favor the groups to
classic book on prejudice. See Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (25th
anniversary ed. 1990) (1954). In the study, Allport showed subjects a picture of sev-
eral people in the subway, including a white man holding a razor and appearing to
argue with a black man. Over half of the subjects reported that the black man held
the razor. See Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, Tie Psychology of Rumor 111
(1965); see also Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Race of Victin, Nonresponsive Bystanders,
and Helping Behavior, 117 J. Soc. Psychol. 69 (1982) (finding that white subjects in
the presence of passive bystanders helped black emergency victims less quickly than
white emergency victims); Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1645, n.162
(finding that when white children between eight and ten years of age were shown
photographs of black and white men and were asked to select the "murderers" among
them, they primarily selected photographs of black males).
Although many believe that white Americans have become substantially more tol-
erant and liberal wvith regard to race in the past several decades, the reality is that
racist attitudes persist but in a more subtle and insidious form. See Samuel L
Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in Prejudice. Discrimina-
tion, and Racism, supra note 10, at 61, 61-89 (discussing "aversive racism" as a conflict
between egalitarian values and "unacknowledged negative feelings and beliefs about
blacks"); see also Neil A. Rector, et al., The Effect of Prejudice and Judicial Ambiguity
on Defendant Guilt Ratings, 133 J. Soc. Psychol. 651, 658 (1992) (stating that prejudi-
cial perceptions affect jury decision-making). This new form of racism has been called
"aversive racism." Gaertner & Dovidio, supra, at 61. In contrast to the more tradi-
tional, "dominative" racist, who acts out his or her bigotry in an openly hostile way,
aversive racists "sympathize with the victims of past injustice; support public policies
that, in principle, promote racial equality and ameliorate the consequences of racism;
identify more generally with a liberal political agenda; regard themselves as nonpreju-
diced and nondiscriminatory; but, almost unavoidably, possess negative feelings and
beliefs about blacks." Id. at 62. Aversive racists, all of whom would easily survive a
cause challenge based on racial attitudes during voir dire, would not manifest their
racism in outright hostility or hate. Instead, underlying their decisionmaking in mat-
ters involving race would be "discomfort, uneasiness, disgust, and sometimes fear[.]"
Id at 63; see also Nickerson et al., supra note 10, at 255 ("Within the American court-
room, individual, institutional, and cultural forms of racism can produce unjustly se-
vere consequences for minority defendants.").
116. See Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1679 (noting that jurors often
do not comprehend or heed jury instructions in the first place, and pointing out that if,
for most jurors, race prejudice is largely unconscious, instructing them to put it aside
is not terribly productive); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 1016, 1027-28 (1988) (stating that, although racism
may be expressed "indirectly, covertly, and often unconsciously," it is still a pervasive
part of who Americans are); Rector et al., supra note 115. at 658 (stating that "preju-
dicial perceptions of the defendant and victim influence juror decisions").
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which we belong. 17 The other is that there is a strong correlation
between race and attitudes about policing.118
It is generally acknowledged that we tend to favor members of our
own racial or ethnic group over those of other groups. 19 Because an
important part of identity is group membership, and because people
like to feel good about themselves, we tend to perceive the groups to
which we belong in positive terms.12 0 Consistent with the comparative
nature of most evaluations, when we attribute an elevated stature to
our own groups, we tend to attribute a lower one to other groups. 2 1
Some researchers have found that "ingroup bias," favoring members
of one's own group, is greatest in members of disadvantaged
groups. This is especially so when the lower status is seen as unde-
117. See Dolores Perez et al., Ethnicity of Defendants and Jurors as Influences on
Jury Decisions, 23 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1249, 1251-56 (1993). Sheri Lynn Johnson
refers to this as "own-race favoritism" and "other-race antagonism." Johnson, Black
Innocence, supra note 104, at 1617; see also Smith & Mackie, supra note 110, at 199-
203 (finding that we tend to look for behavior that confirms the validity of our stereo-
types and ignore or minimize behavior that is contrary to already formed views).
118. African Americans experience the criminal justice system in a very different
way than whites. This different experience is reflected in attitudes about law enforce-
ment generally and the police particularly. See The Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll
Social Audit: Black/White Relations in the United States 1997, at 11 (1997) (finding
that 60% of African Americans believe that police treat them less fairly than whites);
Charles J. Ogletree et al., Beyond the Rodney King Story: An Investigation of Police
Conduct in Minority Communities 7-8 (1995) [hereinafter Ogletree et al., Beyond the
Rodney King Story] (discussing the different views regarding the effectiveness of law
enforcement held by whites, blacks and Hispanics); Kim Taylor-Thompson, The Poli-
tics of Common Ground, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1306, 1313 (1998) (reviewing Randall
Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law (1997)) (noting that studies and polls show that
white jurors tend to credit police officers' testimony, while nonwhite jurors tend to
approach police testimony with skepticism); Black and White in America, Newsweek,
Mar. 7, 1988, at 18, 23 (reporting poll results indicating that blacks believe themselves
to be more harshly treated by the criminal justice system than whites do); Crime,
Cops, and Courts, Pub. Pers., July/Aug. 1991, at 74, 74 (reporting the results of polls
showing that blacks and whites have markedly different views of the prevalence of the
use of force by police officers); Janet Elder, Trial Leaves Public Split on Racial Lines,
N.Y. Times, October 2, 1995, at B9 (reporting that 65% of whites expressed confi-
dence in their local police compared to 37% of blacks, and 71% of whites had confi-
dence in the criminal justice system compared to 52% of blacks); Maria Puente, Poll:
Blacks' Confidence in Police Plummets, USA Today, Mar. 21, 1995, at 3A (reporting
that only 33% of blacks believe that police testify truthfully, and only 18% of blacks
say they would believe police over other witnesses at a trial).
119. See Deidre Golash, Race, Fairness, and Jury Selection, 10 Behav. Sci. & L. 155,
173 (1992); David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An
Overview of the Cognitive Approach, in Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism, supra
note 10, at 127, 130-31; Perez et al., supra note 117, at 1251; cf. Mary A. Newman et
al., Ethnic Awareness in Children: Not a Unitary Concept, 143 J. Genetic Psychol. 103,
109 (1983) (demonstrating that children prefer pictures of same-race children, with
this tendency especially strong in white children).
120. See Hamilton & Trolier, supra note 119, at 156.
121. See id.; see also Smith & Mackie, supra note 110, at 234 ("[EJsteem, considera-
tion, and favoritism await in-group members, whereas disdain, discrimination, and
domination are often the fate of those categorized as out-group members.").
122. See Shawn Meghan Burn, The Social Psychology of Gender 128 (1996).
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served. 1" This would suggest that African Americans have a strong
sense of empathy and connection with other African Americans-
"same-race favoritism"-that might find expression on a jury.124
With regard to attributions of guilt based on race, there seems to be
a consensus that if the evidence is strong, the attitudes and biases of
jurors are less important." When the evidence is not as compelling-
that is, when it is a close case and the jury could go either way-juror
bias may well influence verdicts. 26
123. See id. (citing various studies).
124. The research on this is inconclusive. See Reid Hastie et al., Inside the Jury 128-
29 (1983) (finding little if any correlation between race and pre-deliberation verdict
choices); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The American Jury on Trial:
Psychological Perspectives 29-31 (1988) (assembling studies finding juror demo-
graphic traits unrelated to verdicts in any consistent manner); Rita J. Simon, The Jury:
Its Role in American Society 45-46 (1980) (finding "only slight and not consistent
differences in the verdicts [of] jurors with different class, ethnic, and sexual character-
istics .... "); John R. Hepburn, The Objective Reality of Evidence and the Utility of
Systematic Jury Selection, 4 Law & Hum. Behav. 89, 95 (1980) (finding no apparent
relationship between race and verdict choices); Michael J. Saks, The Limits of Scien-
tific Jury Selection: Ethical and Empirical, 17 Jurimetrics J. 3, 16 (1976) (finding that
the four best predictor variables, including demographics and attitudinal variables,
accounted for less than 13% of verdict variance). Bat see Johnson, Black Innocence,
supra note 104, at 1640 (citing empirical evidence to support the conclusion that "ju-
rors... will tend to convict other-race defendants under circumstances in which they
would acquit same-race defendants"); Sydney P. Freedberg, Report Shows Race a Fac-
tor in Verdicts, Miami Herald, May 11, 1984, at Cl (reporting that an archival study of
the relationship between racial composition and verdicts in Dade County, Florida
found that juries with at least one African American juror were less likely than all-
white juries to convict African American defendants); infra notes 135-36 and accom-
panying text (discussing statistics that show a positive correlation between acquittal
rates and the presence of minority jurors on juries).
125. See Perez et al., supra note 117, at 1258; see also King, Postconviction Review
of Jury Discrimination, supra note 105, at 86 ("The assumption that juror race will
have less influence on jury decisions when the evidence strongly supports guilt is con-
sistent with the theory that explains how stereotypes and other cognitive biases oper-
ate as well as wvith the findings of most empirical studies." (footnote omitted)). There
is also, however, some research to suggest that determinations about the strength of
evidence are not entirely objective, and race and ethnicity play a role here, too. See
Hepburn, supra note 124, at 98 ("Attitudes toward those issues which constitute the
basis for the case and toward those social groups which testify during the trial influ-
ence one's perception of the strength of the evidence presented[.]"); King, Postconvic-
tion Review of Jury Discrimination, supra note 105, at 86 ("The inability of the
strength of the evidence to account completely for the effect of juror race on verdicts
may be due in part to the researchers' own race-based assessments of the strength of
the evidence."); Denis Chimaeze E. Ugvuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror
Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 133, 142 (1979)
(finding that, unlike white subjects, black subjects tended to give a "black defendant
the benefit of the doubt not only when the [prosecution's] evidence [was] doubtful but
even when there was strong evidence against him"). This last finding tends to suggest
that African Americans have the best understanding of the legal principles of burden
of proof, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and presumption of innocence. After all,
these principles do not have less effect simply because the evidence is weighty.
126. See Ugwuegbu, supra note 125, at 143; see also Kalven & Zeisel, supra note
107, at 164-66 (positing a "liberation hypothesis," wherein evidence serves to release
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
There are many studies that suggest that white jurors attribute guilt
to minority defendants more readily than to white defendants. 27 In
her influential article, Black Innocence and the White Jury,128 Sheri
Lynn Johnson cites nine studies that found that the race of the crimi-
nal defendant was a critical factor in the determination of guilt. 129
White mock jurors in all of these studies were more likely to find a
non-white defendant guilty than they were to find an identically-situ-
ated white defendant guilty. 130
If life experience is the most important factor in a juror's evaluation
of evidence,13 1 and race is a significant and distinctive aspect of that
experience, then the race of jurors may well influence their perception
jurors from their biases when it is strong, but allows them their biases when it is
ambiguous).
127. See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 107, at 208-13 (finding that black defendants
were much less likely than white defendants to be the recipients of lenient verdicts
based on sympathy); Rector et al., supra note 115, at 657 (finding that the "overall
positive appeal of [a] defendant was found to be rated lower when he was presented
as Black"); cf William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination
Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 Crime & Delinq. 563, 594 (1980) (finding that
in Florida, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas, cases involving black offenders and white vic-
tims were the most likely to result in the death penalty). Unfortunately, there have
been no recent studies like Kalven and Zeisel's classic one. Apparently, this is partly
due to the reluctance of courts to allow direct and systematic inquiry concerning the
content of jury deliberations. See Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1620.
128. See Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104.
129. See id. at 1626-36; see also id. at 1625 (observing that over one dozen mock
jury studies support the hypothesis that racial bias is a factor in guilt determination,
and that the few studies that initially support the hypothesis that racial bias is not a
factor are, upon close examination, ambiguous).
130. See Henry Allen Bullock, Significance of the Racial Factor in the Length of
Prison Sentences, 52 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 411 (1961); Johnson, Black
Innocence, supra note 104, at 1626; King, Post-Conviction Review of Jury Discrimina-
tion, supra note 105, at 82 (noting that researchers have found that "white jurors are
more likely than black jurors to convict black defendants and are also more likely to
acquit defendants charged with crimes against black victims"); see also Perez et al.,
supra note 117, at 1259 (finding that Anglo majority juries convicted Hispanic defend-
ants more frequently than Anglo defendants under identical circumstances, but His-
panic majority juries did not differ in their conviction rates); Michael L. Radelet &
Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 L. & Soc'y
Rev. 587 (1985) (finding that white subjects tend to find African American defendants
guilty significantly more often than white defendants in murder cases); Marvin E.
Wolfgang & Marc Reidel, Rape, Race and the Death Penalty in Georgia, 45 Am. J.
Orthopsychiatry 658 (1975) (showing that white mock jurors rate black defendants
guilty more often than white defendants in rape and murder cases).
Professor Johnson also points to research showing a connection between the race of
the victim and the race of the defense lawyer and verdicts. See Johnson, Black lnno-
cence, supra note 104, at 1635-36. For research showing that black defendants are
most often found guilty when the victim is white, see Radelet & Pierce, supra;
Ugwuegbu, supra note 125, at 140; and compare Robert W. Hymes et al., Acquain-
tance Rape: The Effect of Race of Defendant and Race of Victim on White Juror Deci-
sions, 133 J. Soc. Psychol. 627 (1993) (finding that participants in a mock jury were
more likely to find a defendant guilty in an acquaintance rape case if the victim's race
was different from the defendant's).
131. See 1 National Jury Project, Inc., supra note 9, § 2.04, 2-10 to 2-24.
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of evidence.' 32 This is consistent with the work of "story model" theo-
rists, who argue that jurors reconstruct legal facts as stories, "whose
plausibility depends on understandings drawn from experience."1 33
As W. Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman noted, -[J]urors who
come from different social worlds may disagree about the meaning
and the plausibility of the same stories."'"
132. See Brown, The Role of Race, supra note 87, at 122 (referring to differences in
"interpretive (and intuitive) analysis"-including differences in "common sense,
deep-seated hunches, and judgments"-as the product of different life experiences
that "often arise from differences in race or gender"): see also Ion M. Van Dyke, Jury
Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels 32
(1977). Van Dyke depicts the situation succinctly:
[A] white juror sitting in a jury box listening to the testimony of a black
witness would sift and evaluate and appraise that testimony through a screen
of preconceived notions about what black people are.... The black juror,
because of more similar life experiences to the black witness would ... ap-
praise that testimony from a distinctively different vantage point ....
Van Dyke, supra, at 32 (citation omitted).
For studies on the effect of racial stereotypes on juror cognition, see, for example.
Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory:
Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 726 (1988):
Taken as a whole, the results of the present experiments provided substantial
support for the idea that the activation of a social stereotype elicits a selec-
tive evidence-processing strategy on the part of decision makers. That is,
evidence that corroborates the implications of the stereotype receives
greater attention, elaboration, and rehearsal, whereas inconsistent evidence
is neglected.
Id. at 734. Consider, as well, David L. Hamilton et al., Stereotype-Based Erpectancies:
Effects on Information Processing and Social Behavior, 46 J. Soc. Issues 35 (1990):
[S]tereotypes operate as a source of expectancies about what a group as a
whole is like.., as well as about what attributes individual group members
are likely to possess .... Their influence can be pervasive, affecting the
perceiver's attention to, encoding of, inferences about, and judgments based
on that information.
Id. at 43. For additional material, see Galen V. Bodenhausen & Meryl Lichtenstein,
Social Stereotypes and Information-Processing Strategies: The Impact of Task Com-
plexity, 52 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 871, 878 (1987) (observing that when test
subjects were given a "complex information-processing objective" and a "relevant"
stereotype, the test subjects used the stereotype to organize the information into a
mental image of the defendant).
133. W. Lance Bennett &.Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Court-
room: Justice and Judgment in American Culture 171 (1981). The -story model"
posits that "jurors impose a narrative story organization on trial information, in which
causal and intentional relations between events are central." Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychol. 242, 243 (1986) (citations omitted). See generally Edwin Hutchins, Cul-
ture and Inference: A Trobriand Case Study 62-106 (1980) (analyzing the narrative
technique by the parties in a land litigation case in Papua New Guinea); Nancy Pen-
nington & Reid Hastie, Juror Decision-Making Models: The Generalization Gap, 89
Psychol. Bull. 246, 254-55 (1981) ("Evaluation for implications involves inferential
processing to interpret the story events with respect to the overall plans, goals, inten-
tions, and motivations of the principal participants.").
134. Bennett & Feldman, supra note 133, at 171. Bennett and Feldman write that:
In place of recognizing legitimate differences in the interpretation of social
experience, jurors more often are compelled to regard unfamiliar story ele-
ments or dissonant interpretations as signs of guilt. When key elements in a
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This may explain why, in some cities, when the number of African
Americans on juries has been increased, there has been an accompa-
nying decrease in conviction rates.135 That majority black juries tend
to acquit criminal defendants more than majority white juries is cer-
tainly something defense lawyers should consider.13 6
Because minorities are more often victims of police misconduct 37
and discriminatory law enforcement,138 they may well be more skepti-
cal of police testimony than whites.139 Black jurors may also have a
different interpretation of certain evidence, based on their distinctive
case are anchored in different social worlds, defendants may be found guilty
simply by reason of their social experiences and their communication styles.
Id. at 179.
135. See Van Dyke, supra note 132, at 33 (noting that, in 1969, when Baltimore jury
commissioners switched from a jury selection method that yielded less than 30%
black jurors to one that yielded 34% to 40% black jurors, the conviction rate dropped
from almost 84% to less than 70%); id. at 35 (reporting that when Los Angeles
County changed its jury selection system to include more black and Hispanic jurors,
the percentage of convictions fell from 67% in 1969 to 47.2% in 1971); see also John-
son, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1622 ("[T]he statistics do suggest that, for
whatever reason, minority race jurors may evaluate evidence differently than do white
jurors."); Benjamin A. Holden et al., Color Blinded? Race Seems to Play an Increas-
ing Role in Many Jury Verdicts, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at Al (indicating that in the
Bronx, where juries are 80% black and Hispanic, the acquittal rate for black defend-
ants was 48%, and the acquittal rate for Hispanic defendants was 38%, in Washing-
ton, D.C., where juries are 70% black and criminal defendants are 95% black, the
acquittal rate was 29%, and in Detroit, where African Americans are the predomi-
nant members of juries, the acquittal rate was 30%, all of which are considerably
higher than the 17% national acquittal rate for all defendants in criminal jury trials).
136. See Holden, supra note 135. But see Richard A. Boswell, Crossing the Racial
Divide: Challenging Stereotypes About Black Jurors, 6 Hastings Women's L.J. 233,
237-38 (1995) (arguing that the "widely-held perception that jurors in the O.J. Simp-
son case were motivated by racial considerations rather than the evidence" and would
likely acquit a black defendant is a particularly offensive form of "juror
stereotyping").
137. See generally Ogletree et al., Beyond the Rodney King Story, supra note 118,
at 29-44 (positing that minorities are subject to abuse by police officers).
138. See Kennedy, supra note 25, at 76-167; Butler, supra note 72, at 1275-82; see
also John Hagan & Celesta Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal
Injustice in America, 88 Am. J. Soc. 329, 352-53 (1982) (concluding that race and class
inform perceptions of criminal injustice). The perception that there is a different legal
system for blacks and the poor is long-standing. See National Advisory Comm'n on
Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 183
(1968) (noting that the courts have lost the confidence of the poor).
139. See Racial Divide Affects Black, White Panelists, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at S8.
In 1992, telephone interviews of nearly 80 jurors who had served in civil and criminal
trials across the nation were conducted. The results revealed that 42% of the white
jurors interviewed said that, given a conflict of testimony between a police officer and
a defendant, the police officer should be believed. Forty-eight percent disagreed, and
9% said they did not know. In contrast, only 25% of African American jurors who
were interviewed thought that the police officer's testimony should be believed, while
70% disagreed. Id.; see also Jeff Rosen, Jurymandering, New Republic, Nov. 30, 1992,
at 15, 16 (finding that black jurors in Washington, D.C. "have grown so mistrustful of
[police] that even trivial inconsistencies in testimony are enough to convince them
that the police are lying" and that "black jurors empathize with defendants of all races
because they resent having been unfairly hassled by the police").
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experience, than their white counterparts. For example, when a de-
fendant flees the police, whites may assume (and may be instructed by
the judge to legally infer) that this ffight suggests consciousness of
guilt."4 African American and other minority jurors might attribute
that same conduct not to the guilty conscience of the defendant, but
rather to the defendant's fear of mistreatment at the hands of the
police.14'
There are studies that suggest that white jurors are more likely than
African Americans to convict African American defendants charged
with assaulting police officers.' 42 There is also wide support for the
view that African American and white jurors react differently to evi-
dence in cases involving violent confrontations between African
Americans and the police.1 43
The research on gender is less extensive and less conclusive.'" We
know at least two things of importance to criminal defense lawyers
who intend to select the fairest possible jury: women participate less
than men in jury deliberations,'14 and men and women evaluate evi-
dence differently in cases that directly invoke gender stereotypes, es-
pecially sexual assault cases. 146 We do not know the extent to which
140. See, eg., Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia 2.44 (4th ed.
1993) ("[Y]ou may consider flight or concealment as a circumstance tending to show
feelings of guilt, and you may also consider feelings of guilt as evidence to show actual
guilt .... ").
141. See, e.g., Boswell, supra note 136, at 239 ("[Wlhile whites appear to believe
that the police and judicial system operate fairly, African Americans do not....
[M]any whites do not perceive race relations as all that bad, while African Americans
do.").
142. See J. L. Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and That of
Jurors in Determining Verdicts, 5 Law & Psychol. Rev. 103, 107-11 (1979).
143. See Minimizing Racism in Jury Trials: The Voir Dire Conducted by Charles R.
Gary in People of California v. Huey P. Newton (Ann Fagan Ginger ed., The Nat'l
Lawyers Guild 1969):
[Tihe single most dominant factor from today's urban black experience that
sets him apart from his white counterpart is contact with the police... [and
it is] the chief complaint of all black communities, and resonant with over-
tones of brutality. This chief component of black experience, the white
American, whether racist or not, does not and cannot share.
Id. at 10; see also Coramae Richey Mann, Unequal Justice: A Question of Color 133-
35 (1993); George J. Church, The Fire This Thne, Time, May 11. 1992, at 18, 22 (dis-
cussing a poll after the Rodney King verdict showing that 23% of whites, compared to
48% of blacks, "felt that in an everyday encounter with police they ran a risk of being
treated unfairly").
144. See Fulero & Penrod, supra note 105, at 245-46.
145. See Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jur, Deliberations, 96 Yale L.
593, 596 (1987) [hereinafter Marder, Gender Dynamics].
146. See generally Lorrie L. Luellig, Why J.E.B. v. T.B. Will Fail to Advance Equal-
ity: A Call for Discrimination in Jury Selection, 10 Wis. Women's L.J. 403, 420 (1995)
(stating that a "correlation exists between a person's sex and the conclusion he or she
would reach in a rape case"). There is also some evidence to suggest that gender
makes a difference in battered women's self-defense cases. See id. at 423-27; see also
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that women are more likely to convict in rape cases and commenting that
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women bring a "different voice '"147 or a distinct moral vision to crimi-
nal decision-making. 148
Studies have shown that women participate significantly less than
men during deliberations.1 49 One study revealed that male jurors
made forty percent more comments than their female counterparts.15 0
Although more talk does not necessarily make the talk more compel-
ling, the study found that the sheer quantity of male jurors' comments
gave it weight.15 1
Studies show that men are perceived by other jurors as more influ-
ential and active than female jurors, even when men and women par-
ticipate at equal rates. 152 Men tend to be elected foreperson more
"one need not be a sexist to share the intuition that ... a person's gender and result-
ing life experience will be relevant to his or her view" in cases such as "sexual harass-
ment. child custody, or spousal or child abuse"); Marilyn Kasian et al., Battered
Women Who Kill: Jury Simulation and Legal Defenses, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 289
(1993); Jeffrey Rosen, Oversexed, New Republic, May 16, 1994, at 12, 14 (citing jury
consultant Marjorie Fargo, who believes that gender has a significant effect "in cases
involving domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse and obscenity," and claims
that seven out of ten women are likely to be unfavorable to the defense in these
cases).
147. Gilligan, supra note 102, at 149 (noting that "changes in women's rights
change women's moral judgments").
148. See Forman, supra note 44, at 48-56 (discussing whether there is a difference
between the way men and women engage in "moral analysis" and whether that differ-
ence is reflected in the jury process). Forman suggests that there is support for the
notion that there are gender differences and that these differences are reflected on
juries. See id. at 50-51.
If indeed women do speak in a "different voice" and bring a distinct vision to
moral dilemmas, we should expect ...that women will bring a different
perspective to bear on the process of judging cases as jurors.
Although no one has tested the applicability of Gilligan's theory to the
jury process, there does exist empirical research regarding gender differ-
ences in attitudes of jurors, their perception of evidence, and their participa-
tion in deliberations.
Id.
149. See Laura Gaston Dooley, Sounds of Silence on the Civil Jury, 26 Val. U. L.
Rev. 405, 407 (1991); Charlan Nemeth et al., From the '50s to the '70s: Women in Jury
Deliberations, 39 Sociometry 293, 302 (1976) (stating that male jurors offered more
suggestions, opinions, and information during deliberations); Fred L. Strodtbeck &
Richard D. Mann, Sex Role Differentiation in Jury Deliberations, 19 Sociometry 3, 5
(1956) (finding that "men originate significantly more acts than women"); Marder,
Gender Dynamics, supra note 145, at 594-99 (discussing gender and participation rates
on juries).
150. See Marder, Gender Dynamics, supra note 145, at 596.
151. See id. at 596 n.18 ("'How much is said ... appears to be more important to
the perception of leadership than what is said ....' (quoting Lawrence J. Smith &
Loretta A. Malandro, Courtroom Communication Strategies § 4.48, at 424 (1985))).
152. See Marder, Gender Dynamics, supra note 145, at 596 n.18; Nemeth et al.,
supra note 149, at 300-04; Strodtbeck & Mann, supra note 149, at 10.
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often than women,'53 and the foreperson plays a crucial role in deter-
mining the verdict.154
There is an abundance of studies demonstrating a correlation be-
tween gender and decision making in a rape or sexual assault case.' 5 s
Contrary to foldore suggesting that women are harder on other wo-
men when it comes to sexual conduct (as in rape cases where consent
is at issue),156 empirical studies demonstrate that women jurors are
more likely to convict rape defendants than their male counter-
parts.' 57 Studies also indicate that women jurors are less influenced
153. See B. Beckham & H. Aronson, Selection of Jury Foremen as a Measure of the
Social Status of Women, 43 Psychol. Rep. 475, 476-77 (1978); Marder, Gender Dynam-
ics, supra note 145, at 595 n.9. One mock jury study found that of 155 jury foreper-
sons, 14 were women and 141 were men. In that study, women constituted 46% of the
jurors but only nine percent of forepersons. See Beckham & Aronson, supra, at 477
tbl.1; see also Carol J. Mills & Wayne E. Bohannon, Juror Characteristics: To What
Extent Are They Related to Jury Verdicts?, 64 Judicature 22, 31 (1980) (noting that the
"odds of females serving as jury fore[persons] ... were only half [that of] males").
154. See Rita James Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity 115 (1967) (stat-
ing that the mean participation rate of foreperson was 31.1% compared to 7.5% for
other jurors); Marder, Gender Dynamics, supra note 145, at 595; Thomas Sannito &
Edward Burke Amolds, Jury Study Results: The Factors at Work, 5 Trial Dipl. 1. 6,7
(1982) (indicating that from 550 completed juror questionnaires, 79% of jurors de-
scribed foreperson as either "talkative," "one of the most talkative," or -the most
talkative" compared to other jurors).
155. See Lawrence G. Calhoun et al., Social Perception of the Victim 's Causal Role
in Rape: An Exploratory Examination of Four Factors, 29 Hum. Rel. 517,523 (1976);
James H. Davis et al., The Decision Processes of 6- and 12-Person Mock Juries As-
signed Unanimous and Tivo-Thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1,
6 (1975); Marsha B. Jacobson, Effects of Victim's and Defendant's Physical Attractive-
ness on Subjects' Judgments in a Rape Case, 7 Sex Roles 247, 252-53 (1981) (finding
that women were more likely to find a defendant charged with rape guilty and to
recommend longer prison terms than men); Luellig, supra note 146, at 420-21 n.115
(citations omitted); Marder, Gender Dynamics, supra note 145, at 605 n.58; Michael
G. Rumsey & Judith M. Rumsey, A Case of Rape: Sentencing Judgments of Males and
Females, 41 Psychol. Rep. 459,464 (1977) (finding that women tend to express greater
certainty of guilt than men in rape cases whether the evidence is strong or more
equivocal, while men tended to exculpate a defendant when the evidence was more
equivocal by transferring part of the blame to the victim); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148-49 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A plethora of
studies make clear that in rape cases ... female jurors are somewhat more likely to
vote to convict than male jurors." (citation omitted)). But see Nelligan, supra note
105, at 250 (examining 86 juries in rape cases and finding that the number of men and
women on the juries was "unrelated to their propensity to convict or acquit"). Nell-
gan himself, however, expressed wariness about the results of his study: "[T]he re-
sults of this study should not be interpreted to suggest that gender composition of
juries makes no difference and may be disregarded in the jury selection process." Id.
156. See, eg., 3 Melvin M. Belli, Modem Trials, § 51.67-.68, at 446-47 (2d ed. 1982)
("A woman is inclined to forgive sin in the opposite sex, but definitely not her own
...."); see also Martin Blinder, Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice of Law § 12.3, at
120 (3d ed. 1982) ("[Tlhe innate attraction between the sexes, with this initial, instinc-
tual distrust between many women, makes them surprisingly good defense jurors in
rape trials .... ).
157. See Marder, Gender Dynamics, supra note 145, at 605 n.58.
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by a rape complainant's virginity or social status. 58 Women are also
less persuaded by the range of myths about rape.'5 9 Men tend to iden-
tify more with the defendant and find the defendant's testimony more
credible than do women jurors.1 60
Racism is out there. Sexism is out there. They persist whether we
want them to or not.16 1 The civil rights and women's movements
brought gains, but real social change is a slow process. "Justice is a
constant struggle."162 Lawyers, especially those defending the least
powerful and most despised among us, should not pretend that the
battle against racism and sexism has been won and that any twelve
jurors will be fair and impartial in every case. They should not pre-
tend that all prospective jurors will afford disproportionately poor,
black defendants the legal protections to which they are entitled.
158. See Luellig, supra note 146, at 421-22 (finding that men are more likely than
women to hold traditional views of sex roles in rape trials).
159. See Marder, Gender Dynamics, supra note 145, at 605.
160. See Luellig, supra note 146, at 421-22. Compare this trial's result:
In a celebrated case in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., in 1989, a jury acquitted a
Georgia man on charges of abducting and raping a 22-year-old woman he
had met in a parking lot. The acquittal came after the jurors were shown a
lacy white miniskirt and bright green tank top that the woman wore on the
night of the incident. After the trial ... jury foreman Roy Diamond said,
"We all feel she asked for it for the way she was dressed."
Peter Marks & Michele Ingrassia, When the Rapist is Someone She Knows: Date
Rape, Newsday, July 21, 1991, at 4.
The above example brings to mind the William Kennedy Smith rape case, in which
the complainant danced closely with Smith, kissed him in public, and accompanied
him to his home after midnight. The author has always believed that a crucial prob-
lem for the prosecution was the fact that the complainant admitted to having taken off
her pantyhose when she was with Smith. Although this is perfectly innocent conduct
for a woman about to walk on a beach, the "panty" part of pantyhose is sexually
suggestive. Had she been wearing socks, she probably would have been better off. Of
course, the William Kennedy Smith case was complicated by many other issues, in-
cluding the fame and attractiveness of the defendant, the credibility of a number of
prosecution witnesses, and the relative skill of the lawyers. The jury may even have
included an equal number of men and women. For a sample of interesting perspec-
tives on the William Kennedy Smith case, see Ellen Goodman, In Smith Trial's After-
math, What Does It All Mean?: Overblown Case's 'Lessons' Overstated, Palm Beach
Post, Dec. 16, 1991, at A15 (stating that if the author, a femininist columnist, had been
a juror, she would have acquitted Smith because the prosecution failed to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt); Al Kamen & Ruth Marcus, Experts Fault Prosecu-
tor for Uninspired Performance in Tough Case, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1991, at A22
(reporting widespread criticism of the prosecutor for her ineffectual cross-examina-
tion of the defendant); Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Palm Beach Hanging, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 15, 1991, § 4, at 15 (describing the defense lawyer's tactics as
"misogynist").
161. This also applies to the differences between many groups. See George P.
Fletcher, Political Correctness in Jury Selection, 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1995)
[hereinafter Fletcher, Political Correctness] ("We should recognize that men and wo-
men are often different. Blacks, whites, and Asian-Americans are often different.
Jews and Christians are often different. The European-born and American-born are
often different.").
162. This is the slogan of the National Lawyers Guild.
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B. Criminal Trial Experience Relating to Race and Gender
As far as I am able to ascertain, my own experience as a criminal
trial lawyer is consistent with the social science research discussed
above.' 63 In the two cases I described in the beginning of this article,
my understanding of the significance of race in American life and
criminal trials informed every strategic decision, from jury selection
through closing argument. Fortunately, this approach contributed to
acquittals for both clients.
In the first case, in which my client was an African American
charged with assaulting white police officers, the evidence against my
client was fairly strong: the sworn testimony of two experienced po-
lice officers. There was virtually no chance of getting any African
Americans on the jury, because of the jury pool in Middlesex County,
Massachusetts. Notwithstanding our efforts to get just one African
American on the jury,"64 we had an all-white jury. Perhaps I am
overly pessimistic about the capacity of white jurors to discredit police
testimony,'65 but I believe that Mr. Reed's impressive background
(West Point, Harvard, his future professional ambitions, his lack of
any criminal record), and the fact that we intentionally called many
white character and fact witnesses, more white witnesses than African
Americans, made a difference. Mr. Reed was not simply one more
young black man charged with street violence. Who Mr. Reed was,
and how we presented him, made him more palatable to the jurors,
made him less a member of a "black outgroup," and put pressure on
the all-white jury not to convict.1 66
In the second case, in which my client was a white man accused of
killing a homeless African American man, the evidence against my
client was not so compelling, and we had a fairly strong case of self-
defense. We also had a better chance here than in Cambridge of get-
ting some people on the jury who were of the same race as my cli-
163. See supra Part II.
164. Studies show that one African American would not be enough to change the
dynamics in deliberation. See Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1698
("Twelve Angry Men to the contrary, jury dynamics research shows that a single dis-
senting juror virtually never succeeds in hanging a jury, let alone reversing its predis-
position." (footnote omitted)). But cf Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman, New
Yorker, Feb. 24 & Mar. 3, 1997, at 54, 54-59 (suggesting that in Washington. D.C.,
there is a growing phenomenon of lone African American women disregarding evi-
dence in order to prevent convicting African American men). Although I have not
practiced in the District of Columbia long, I have not observed what Rosen suggests is
regularly occurring.
165. See Lawrence Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King
Trial and the Use of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 571,
573 (1993) ("The talented trial attorney is a student of human nature, all too often
concentrating on its dark side.").
166. See supra note 117. We also made explicit reference to race-to the fact that
our client was young and black and, notwithstanding his many accomplishments, was
frequently stopped by the police simply because he was young and black-when our
client testified and in closing argument.
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ent, 167 but we wanted more than a token presence.1 68 We worried that
there would be strong feelings of same-race favoritism by African
American jurors toward the decedent and a key prosecution witness,
who, like the decedent, was homeless. We also worried that a largely
African American jury might believe that an acquittal here, no matter
how strong the evidence of self-defense, would devalue the life of an
impoverished African American. 69
As a result of pure luck, the panel of prospective jurors that entered
the courtroom on the first day of trial was "whiter" than the usual
District of Columbia panels, 7 ° providing a better chance of securing
whites on the jury. Using a race-conscious jury selection strategy,17'
we succeeded in obtaining a jury that was half black and half white.
We made a number of other race-conscious decisions at trial: half of
the character witnesses we called were African American; we explic-
itly talked about the value of the decedent's life, notwithstanding his
life circumstances at the time of his death; and we explicitly, but cau-
tiously, talked about the role of race in the case.
Like most homicides, the case was very emotional.'72 We believed,
however, that the case had gone well for the defense: much of the
government's evidence was consistent with self-defense; the medical
examiner had supported our theory of how the wounds suffered by
the decedent were inflicted; and the defense witnesses had succeeded
in painting a picture of the defendant as a good, nonviolent, non-racist
person. We expected a quick acquittal.
Instead, the jury deliberated for several hours over two days before
reaching a verdict of not guilty. I do not mean to suggest that there is
anything wrong with lengthy deliberations; indeed, where one life has
been lost and another person's liberty is on the line, and a host of
other serious issues are raised, jurors should devote time and serious
thought to a case. What we learned from jurors after the verdict, how-
ever, confirmed our race-conscious strategy. The jury instantly di-
vided on race lines, with whites believing the defendant innocent of
any criminal wrongdoing and African Americans worried that any-
thing short of a conviction would devalue black life. The jury foreper-
167. See supra note 135.
168. See supra note 164.
169. See Christopher Jencks, The Homeless 22, tbl.4 (1994) (stating that 44% of all
surveyed homeless were African American). See generally id. passim (discussing
forces that caused an increase in homelessness during the 1980s).
170. See Holden, supra note 135.
171. We explicitly wanted a jury of at least four or five whites, and exercised per-
emptory challenges with this goal in mind. Of course, there were other considera-
tions, chief among them the jurors' attitudes about self-defense (and, in particular, the
taking of life in self-defense), and their attitudes about the homeless. Diane Wiley of
the National Jury Project in Minneapolis assisted us in jury selection strategy, devel-
opment of questions for voir dire, and articulation of the defense theory.
172. The trial featured, among other noteworthy moments, an angry outburst by
the decedent's sister in the middle of the defense's closing argument.
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son was a white man who had worked for a prominent progressive
African American Congressman and had an African American girl-
friend. He claimed these were the reasons why he was acceptable to
both races. According to the foreperson and other jurors, the jury
talked at length about race and privilege and the double standard in
criminal justice. They said it was helpful that the defendant had two
African American witnesses who vouched for his good character.
My discussion of these two cases is, of course, self-serving in the
context of this Article. It is a very small sample of cases, not some-
thing that would qualify as even amateur social science. The discus-
sion also suffers from all of the problems that arise when lawyers
generalize from unverifiable experience.' 73
Still, in my experience as a criminal lawyer, these cases fit a pattern.
Race matters. In most criminal cases, the racial composition of a jury
matters. I have also tried many cases involving crimes of sexual vio-
lence and domestic violence, and I believe that, at least in some crimi-
nal cases, gender matters.
As a result of my own trial experience and what I have learned from
jury research, I believe I would be ineffective as a lawyer if I did not
make both race-conscious and gender-conscious strategic decisions on
behalf of criminal defendants. This includes decisions relating to jury
selection.
IV. ETHICS IN CONTEXT: THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF
ZEALOUS CRIMINAL DEFENSE
The Supreme Court may preach as it may, but we cannot banish
cultural stereotypes from our thinking .... The way to achieve
[diverse juries] is not to impose arbitrary rules on lawyers about
when and why they can use their peremptory challenges.
-George P. Fletcher1 74
The ideal that the peremptory serves is that the jury not only should
be fair and impartial, but should seem to be so to those whose for-
tunes are at issue.
-Barbara Allen Babcock 17-
173. See supra note 109. I also concede that these cases could support the view
held by Jeffrey Abramson and others, see Abramson, supra note 7, at 175-76, that the
race of jurors is not the overriding factor in trial outcomes. After all, an all-white jury
acquitted an African American man notwithstanding credible testimony by white po-
lice officers, and a jury with six African Americans who were concerned about the
racial implications of a case still acquitted a white man who killed an African
American.
174. Fletcher, With Justice for Some, supra note 62, at 250-51.
175. Babcock, Voir Dire, supra note 7, at 552.
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[The jury is the] criminal defendant's fundamental "protection of
life and liberty against race or color prejudice."
-McCleskey v. Kemp 
176
Criminal defense lawyers practice law in a particular context. The
institutional context is the adversarial system.177 There, notwithstand-
ing ethical mandates to the contrary,178 prosecutors and defense law-
yers are both engaged in mortal combat. The system fosters this and,
with rare exception, 179 the lawyers revel in it.
The adversarial system is the best system for defending the rights of
the criminally accused 180 and protecting the rights of the poor.181
Strong advocacy-going to the mat for one's client-is the best way to
ensure that client's liberty and dignity.' 82 Demonstrating zeal on be-
half of those accused of crime is an expression of fidelity to those who
have no one else. There is virtue in this.183
The current cultural and political context is harshly retributive
against criminal lawbreakers. 8 4 No explanation or excuse suffices
when a crime has been committed. 85 No prison sentence is too long,
no prison conditions too harsh, no method of execution too cruel.'8 6
It is in this context that the criminal lawyer "discriminates."'18 7 It is
in this context that the criminal lawyer will note the prevailing cultural
176. 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309
(1880)).
177. See Luban, Lawyers and Justice, supra note 22, at 56-58.
178. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1980).
179. Unfortunately, in my experience, there are more defense lawyers who demon-
strate a woeful lack of zeal than prosecutors whose zeal is appropriately restrained.
See Dershowitz, Best Defense, supra note 38, at 410-14 (noting the problem of under-
zealousness on the part of defense lawyers).
180. See Monroe H. Freedman, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 63 (1996) [hereinafter Freedman, Postmodern Zeal] (responding to criticism
of the adversary system). But cf Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Ad-
versary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5
(1996) (criticizing the adversary system from the perspective of multiculturalism).
181. See Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 Ohio St. J. on Disp.
Resol. 1 (1993) (critically examining the emphasis on "harmony" values over "justice"
values in alternative dispute resolution especially on behalf of those with little power).
182. See Freedman, Postmodern Zeal, supra note 180, at 63 ("I premise my own
system of lawyers' ethics on individual dignity and autonomy."); Smith & Montross,
supra note 67.
183. See Smith & Montross, supra note 67.
184. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text; see also Elliott Currie, Crime,
Justice, and the Social Environment, in The Politics of Law 294, 299 (David Kairys ed.,
2d ed. 1990) (discussing the high rate of incarceration in the United States in compari-
son to other industrial democracies).
185. Even well-known criminal defense lawyers have jumped on this bandwagon.
See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, The Abuse Excuse: And Other Cop-Outs, Sob Stories,
and Evasions of Responsibility (1994).
186. See Wendy Kaminer, It's All the Rage: Crime and Culture 6-7 (1995).
187. See Fletcher, Political Correctness, supra note 161. at 6 ("The problem with
addressing discrimination in the selection of particular juries is that the activity is, by
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sensibilities, stereotypes, and prejudices and use them on behalf of
clients who are typically the unhappy targets of these sensibilities, ste-
reotypes and prejudices.t 8
It is hard enough for a criminal defendant standing trial- there are
enough wrongful assumptions, prejudices, and hostilities directed to-
ward the criminally accused.18 9 When one factors in that most crimi-
nal defendants are poor and disproportionately nonwhite, 9 ' the
situation is that much worse.' 91
No matter how personally distasteful or morally unsettling,192 zeal-
ous advocacy demands that criminal defense lawyers use whatever
they can, including stereotypes, to defend their clients.1 93 Criminal
lawyers are "not allowed to refrain from lawful advocacy simply be-
cause it offends" them.194
This applies to jury selection' 95 as well as a range of other strategic
decisions at trial. 196 Although this is increasingly difficult in the face
its nature, discriminatory. Lawyers want some people on the jury and not others.");
see also Hunt, supra note 109 ("There isn't a trial lawyer in this country who wouldn't
tell you[,] if he were being honest[, that:] I don't want an impartial jury. I want one
that's going to find in my client's favor." (quoting Herald Price Fahringer, a well-
known criminal defense lawyer)).
188. See Nilsen, supra note 39, at 9 ("It is because bias is so pervasive in the crimi-
nal justice system that lawyers rely on it to help win cases. Stereotypes based on
gender, disability, and sexual preference are commonly exploited." (footnotes omit-
ted)). But see Vogelman, supra note 165, at 576-77 (arguing that the white police of-
ficer defendants prosecuted in state court for beating Rodney King benefited from
racist stereotypes about "big black men").
189. See 1 National Jury Project, Inc., supra note 9, § 2.04[21[a], at 2-12 to 2-21
(indicating that, contrary to well-established constitutional principles, many people
believe that if a person has been arrested, she or he must have done something wvrong,
a defendant has some burden to prove his or her innocence, and that defendants
should be required to testify on his or her own behalf); see also Hunt, supra note 109
(referring to two national polls which indicate that a third or more of Americans
consider a criminal defendant "probably guilty," and noting that few admit this in the
courtroom).
190. See Smith & Montross, supra note 67.
191. See Brown, Shield for the Pariah, supra note 8, at 1208 ("[T]he peremptory is
one of the few tools we have to try to right the imbalance faced by a defendant who is
unpopular, who nobody likes, who jurors start out hating because of the color of his
skin, or because of some other thing over which that person has no control.").
192. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
193. See Kaine, supra note 49, at 373-83 (examining ethical codes relating to a law-
yer's use of race in strategic judgments and finding that they say nothing about this
practice); see also Nilsen, supra note 39, at 17, 27-28 (noting that, although it is diffi-
cult to embrace zealous advocacy when it appears to be "exploitative, it is important
... to understand fully the criminal lawyer's obligation to pursue every lawful advan-
tage on behalf of her client"). But cf Vogelman, supra note 165, at 574-75 (concluding
that "the blatant exploitation of racism, homophobia or ethnic prejudices by a defense
lawyer is unethical").
194. See Nilsen, supra note 39, at 17.
195. See id. at 34-35.
196. See id. at 33-37 (discussing the role of bias in crafting a theory of defense,
investigation, judge shopping, jury selection, plea bargaining tactics, and
investigation).
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of Batson, J.E.B., and McCollum, it must be done. 197 The preeminent
obligation of criminal defense lawyers is zealous advocacy, putting the
government to its burden of proof and fighting for the individual ac-
cused above all others. 198 Hence, in order to abide by this overriding
professional obligation, criminal defense lawyers must do what they
can to circumvent McCollum.
There are ways to do this. Much has been written about
prosecutorial pretext in order to avoid the strictures of Batson. 199 De-
fense lawyers can always cite occupation, neighborhood, lack of expe-
rience with the issues raised, and even failure to look the defendant in
the eye2 00 as reasons for striking prospective jurors.20
197. See id. at 34-35 (discussing the difficulties of eliminating jurors who would be
least sympathetic to a defendant's case because of restrictions on the exercise of per-
emptory challenges created by the Supreme Court and state courts). Professor Nilsen
shares the particular dilemma I experience as a clinical law teacher:
Suppose the defendant was a battered woman on trial for injuring her abu-
sive husband. Is it fair to preclude her from using her peremptory challenges
to exclude men in favor of women? As a teacher, how do I advise students
on this issue? It is a challenge to delicately weave our way through this
thicket in search of perfect, non-pretextual, and neutral challenges even
while believing that race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation do indeed
make a difference.
Id. at 35 (footnote omitted).
198. This is especially so for criminal lawyers representing the poor. See id. at 21;
Luban, Criminal Defenders, supra note 22, at 1765.
199. See supra note 44.
200. But see Thrsio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205, 1212-13 n.7 (D.C. 1993) (stating
that peremptory challenges based on body language and demeanor must be closely
scrutinized).
201. During the time I was writing this Article, I tried a drug distribution case with
one of the post-graduate fellows in the E. Barrett Prettyman Fellowship program at
the Georgetown University Law Center. The theory of defense was police
fabrication: our client had not distributed drugs to anyone. Instead, the police in-
vented a story involving the defendant when they discovered drugs near him. We
wanted jurors who would be able to find the testifying police officers incredible based
on a number of relatively small inconsistencies in their accounts. Believing that Afri-
can American jurors would be better jurors for this case, see supra Part III, we exer-
cised almost all of our peremptory challenges on whites. The prosecutor noticed this
and made a "reverse Batson" objection, always a dramatic, morally-tinged moment.
In response, we easily rattled off race-neutral reasons for our strikes (for example,
one juror's employment rendered him too removed from life on the street to fairly
hear the case, another juror had too many police relations, another juror had been the
victim of street crime that may have been drug-related) until we came to one juror
about whom we knew absolutely nothing except for his race. He had not raised his
hand in response to any voir dire questions. The computer sheet only indicated that
he was retired and lived in the northwest section of the city (the largest residential
neighborhood and where most white people live). The man was white, in his sixties,
and had an oddly ominous, blank stare. When we consulted our client about whether
he wanted this man on the jury, our client immediately said "no," because the pro-
spective juror made him uncomfortable. While I believe that our client's discomfort
was not necessarily race-based and ought to be honored, see 4 Blackstone, supra note
1, at *1024, when we tried to proffer it, the judge dismissed it out of hand. We imme-
diately countered with a more concrete reason: the prospective juror never looked at
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"NICE WORK IF YOU CAN GET IT"
Defense lawyers should do what they can to obtain a critical mass of
jurors who are the same race as the defendant.20 2 Jury research shows
that a single dissenting juror almost never succeeds in either hanging
or reversing the direction of a jury.203 Laboratory and field studies
demonstrate that without a minority of at least three jurors, group
pressure is simply too strong". One or two dissenting jurors eventu-
ally yield to the majority view.205
Criminal lawyers should seek same-race or same-sex jurors in cer-
tain cases not because they want jurors who are "partial" to the de-
fendant, but because they want jurors who are impartial.0 6  If a
critical mass of jurors are the same race or same sex as the defendant,
at least as to those jurors, unconscious racism or sexism does not play
a significant role in deliberations. 7
our client the entire time he was in the jury box or the courtroom. The judge ac-
cepted this reason and overruled the prosecutor's objection.
In the spirit of full disclosure, after several hours of deliberations over two days,
our client was found guilty by a jury of ten African Americans and two whites. I do
not mean to suggest that a jury that is largely the same race as the defendant will
automatically acquit. I do think, however, that this particular jury struggled more
over the evidence than a largely white jury would have. In addition, although we had
achieved more than a "critical mass" of African American jurors by the time we got
to the white man in the venire, I stand behind the practice of getting as many same-
race jurors, especially when it comes to representing minority defendants.
202. Cf. Fletcher, Political Correctness, supra note 161, at 6 ("It is perfectly sensible
to conclude, as did the Court in Batson, that when the prosecution discriminates
against people who look like the defendant, the defendant is less likely to get a fair
trial.").
203. See Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1698. Professor Johnson pro-
poses that there be a "right" to racially similar jurors and this right belongs to the
defendant, not the prosecution or public. See id. at 1695-1700. The defendant could
waive this right if he or she wished, but a court would have to determine that such a
waiver was knowing and intentional. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known fight or
privilege").
204. See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 107, at 462-63; Michael J. Saks, Jury Verdicts:
The Role of Group Size and Social Decision Rule 16-18 (1977); Dale W. Broeder, The
University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Neb. L. Rev. 744, 748 (1959).
205. See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 107, at 462-63; Saks, supra note 204, at 16-18;
Broeder, supra note 204, at 748; Rita James Simon & Prentice Marshall, The Jury
System, in The Rights of the Accused in Law and Action 211, 227-27 (Stuart S. Nagel
ed., 1972).
206. See Golash, supra note 119, at 169 (suggesting that jurors may be "more nearly
'impartial' when they try a defendant of their own race"); see also Hunt, supra note
109 (quoting Richard Lempert: "[T~he effort to pick jurors biased in your favor fails,
because the other side spots them and gets rid of them.").
207. See Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 104, at 1678-79 (noting that jury
instructions on racial bias are ineffective, because jurors often do not understand or
pay attention to jury instructions, and because the problem of race and guilt attribu-
tion is unconscious). See generally Lawrence, supra note 114, at 324 (discussing uncon-
scious racism and proposing that courts "evaluate governmental conduct to determine
whether it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches a racial
significance").
1998]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
The Anglo-American jury is a remarkable political institution. We
have had it with us for so long that any sense of surprise over its
main characteristics has perhaps somewhat dulled. It recruits a
group of twelve laymen, chosen at random from the widest popula-
tion; it convenes them for the purpose of the particular trial; it en-
trusts them with great official powers of decision; it permits them to
carry on deliberations in secret and to report out their final judg-
ment without giving reasons for it; and, after their momentary ser-
vice to the state has been completed, it orders them to disband and
return to private life .... The jury is thus by definition an exciting
experiment in the conduct of serious human affairs, and it is not
surprising that, virtually from its inception, it has been the subject of
deep controversy, attracting at once the most extravagant praise
and the most harsh criticism.
-Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel,
The American Jury2
08
Criminal defenders must be good lawyers first and then, if possible,
good citizens. If the two are in conflict, criminal defense lawyers must
always choose the obligation to their client over the obligation to their
community. Criminal lawyers already have their hands full trying to
stave off disaster for an individual client; they cannot be responsible
for fixing the intractable problems of racism and sexism. 0 9
Given the significance of race and gender in American life, criminal
defense lawyers must not regard Batson, J.E.B., and McCollum as an
ethical mandate. They must be wise about the role of race and gender
in jury deliberations and attribution of guilt. In jury selection, as in all
strategic decisions, they must be zealous, fiercely loyal advocates, us-
ing whatever they can to preserve their client's liberty.
208. Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 107, at 3-4.
209. See Fletcher, Political Correctness, supra note 161, at 11 ("[Lawyers] have a job
to do. Neither the prosecution nor the defense has time to worry whether its tactics,
in the Court's words, 'ratify and reinforce prejudicial views .... ').
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